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Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the fifteen union republics of the 
former superpower separated into newly independent sovereign states. The largest of these, 
the Russian Federation, has since emerged as the most capable and politically assertive and 
has inherited the majority of its predecessor’s geopolitical and strategic interests. Though 
Moscow’s interests in its “near-abroad”  reflect the implications of its longstanding imperial 1
legacy in the region, Russia entered the post-Soviet period pursuing a confused strategy of 
disengagement with regards to the new and unstable countries of the Former Soviet Union 
(FSU). Beginning in mid-1992 and continuing into late-1994, however, Russia began 
implementing a more assertive and interventionist response strategy to address the region’s 
growing instability. Though these actions were categorized by so-called liberal 
internationalists in the Russian government as “peacekeeping” operations, they in practice 
served largely to forward the national interests of the Russian Federation, namely the 
enforcement of target state membership in the Confederation of Independent States (CIS), the 
prevention of external interference, and the perpetuation of Russian military presence in the 
key geopolitical choke points of the former Soviet Union.  
My research draws from a combination of constructivism and historical institutionalist 
theory to demonstrate how, despite the Russian government’s early commitment to 
internationalist norms, fluid institutional preconditions allowed for a series of key structural 
shifts in the early post-Soviet period to drive administrative inertia away from the weakly 
institutionalized liberal-pacifist ideals of the Gorbachev era and towards a more muscular, 
nationalist, and zero-sum foreign policy strategy. In this context, the period from mid-1992 
1 Drawn from the Russian ​blizhneye zarubezhye​,​ ​the term arose in popularity within Russia following the 
collapse of the USSR as a common reference to the territories currently comprising the fourteen other former 
Soviet territories. Though it remains in partial use today, the term developed somewhat of a negative 
connotation towards the late 1990’s as a term borne primarily of Russian imperialism.  
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through late-1994 saw a rise in Russian intervention in the near abroad as intervening events 
challenged the orthodoxy of the isolationists in power and legitimized the efforts of 
revanchist policy entrepreneurs framing the use of force as a justifiable and necessary foreign 
policy strategy.  
To effectively demonstrate this shift, I will be reviewing and assessing the nature of 
Russia’s involvement in the secessionist wars in Moldova and Georgia as case studies for 
assessing the development of Russian foreign policy making in the near abroad. Drawing 
from sources pertaining to these conflicts I will then present a set of narratives detailing the 
sources of these conflicts as well as the development of Russia’s interventionist strategy as 
they pertain to this observed shift in the foreign policy calculation of the Russian Federation. 
Ultimately, this project will contribute to the debate within international relations over the 
specific mechanisms that shape actor preferences and lead states to pursue foreign 
intervention.  
I have limited my set of cases to a small handful of ethnic conflicts in the near abroad 
in order to focus specifically on the coercive strategy Russian policymakers develop in the 
context of conflict resolution in the near abroad. I have therefore excluded discussion of 
Russia’s peacekeeping intervention in Tajikistan as it is both geographically removed from 
my focus area of the greater Black Sea and lacks the same coercive elements present in other 
instances of intervention. I also eschew focus on the conflict between Armenia and 
Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh given that the proposed Russian peacekeeping mission 
was never deployed and that evidence for Russia’s indirect interference is comparatively less 
abundant. I have also excluded coverage of Russia’s intervention into Chechnya given that it 
occurs beyond the chronological scope of my project and also technically qualifies as a 
domestic conflict. Lastly, I have chosen not to include discussion of Crimea and the war in 
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Eastern Ukraine given similar time frame issues, alongside the fact that their ongoing status 
limits access to reliable information regarding the conflict and its combatants. Furthermore, a 
comparison of cases, as opposed to a singular case study, will aid in demonstrating the 
gradual evolution of consensus in regarding policy towards the near abroad.  
At this point it is necessary to effectively operationalize my use of the term 
“intervention” within the context of my argument. To do so, I rely on James Rosenau’s 
definition of the term as ​“any action whereby one state has an impact upon the affairs of 
another,” qualified as such through its ​convention-breaking ​behavior - the degree to which an 
intervention breaks from formerly established behavior - and its ​authority-orientated​ nature - 
whether intervention is aimed at maintaining or altering the authority structure of the target 
nation.  Although the degree to which Russian interventionist actions constitute 2
convention-breaking behavior is tempered by Moscow’s history of frequent and direct 
intervention in these republics during the Soviet period, this project aims to understand the 
behavior of the Russian Federation and thus recognizes the breakup of the USSR as 
constituting a sufficient break from former practices. A​ccepting this potential caveat, the 
scope of convention-breaking and authority-breaking behavior Russia employs in these 
conflicts is broad, ranging from but not limited to: the provision of financial assistance, 
military equipment, logistics training and/or direct military aid to a target faction; the 
deployment of purportedly neutral peacekeeping forces; the weaponization of conflict 
resolution as a tool of coercive diplomacy.  
The structure of this project will proceed as follows. Chapter One will contain a 
contextual engagement and assessment of the alternative explanations for Russia’s behavior 
in the near abroad offered by competing schools in international relations followed by a more 
2 James N. Rosenau, "Intervention as a Scientific Concept," ​Journal of Conflict Resolution 13​ (June 1969): 153. 
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in depth summation of my argument and the historical factors supporting it. In Chapter Two I 
will provide a short section on foreign policy debate in the early Russian Federation 
alongside an overview of the country’s institutional structure as well as the key actors and 
organizations that initially helped shape Russia’s foreign policy decision making. Chapter 
Three will include a brief but critical overview of Soviet Nationalities policy as it pertains to 
the conflict spirals that developed. Chapters Four and Five will detail my two separate case 
studies, Moldova and Georgia, respectively, with emphasis on the development, 
implementation, and implications of Russia’s intervention strategy. The final section will be a 
conclusion in which I reassert and defend my argument that a constructivist understanding of 
the structural, institutional, and domestic shifts that influenced Russian policy best explains 
















Chapter One - Alternative Explanations & Argument Summary 
Structural Theories 
In order to assess the development of Russia’s interventionist strategy from the 
perspective of international relations theory, it is first crucial to review and assess the 
competing explanations for state behavior posed by other theories and paradigms. The 
mainstream structural theories that traditionally prevail in international relations discourse, 
neo-realism and liberal institutionalism, present differing, though fundamentally similar 
frameworks for understanding the behavior of states. Both rely on assumptions regarding the 
implications of international anarchy and the relative preference stability of individual level 
agents that such structural forces induce. 
Neo-realists, also known as structural realists, generally hold that the the lack of an 
international arbiter with a global monopoly on the use of force breeds anarchy, forcing states 
to compete for power with one another on a zero-sum basis.  They also assert broadly that 3
states constitute the primary actor in international affairs and are generally assumed to be 
rational actors committed to their continued security as ensured by “self-help” strategies, 
namely the maintenance and projection of political, economic, and military power.  The 4
argument thus follows that states pursue intervention to either expand their influence or to 
respond to threats from potential rivals. Under these circumstances, neorealist theories would 
assert that Russia’s interests and behavior are determined by its geography and position in the 
international system and that such interests are fundamentally inescapable. 
3 Andrew Bennett, ​Condemned to Repetition? The Rise, Fall, and Reprise of Soviet-Russian Military 
Interventionism, 1973-1996​, MIT Press, BCSIA Studies in International Security, Cambridge, 1999, 6.  
4 Kenneth Waltz, ​Theory of International Politics, ​p. 118. Waltz, however, has emphasized that, while states are 
of course not unitary actors, the unitary state assumption can remain implicit in his argument since the pressures 
and conditions of the international system are still the primary forces that shape elites’ behavior and preferences 
once they hold positions of power. For more see: Kenneth N. Waltz, "Response to My Critics," in Keohane, 
Neorealism and Its Critics, pp. 338-39.  
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As many have noted, however, this pessimistic understanding of statecraft is belied by 
the considerable degree of international cooperation characteristic of the post-WWII era. This 
position is championed by liberal institutionalists, who highlight the ways in which 
international institutions can mitigate the negative implications of anarchy by helping to 
enforce inter-state commitments, lowering transaction costs, and providing incentive 
structures for states to encourage cooperation and discourage delinquency.  Therefore liberal 5
institutionalists largely frame intervention as a tool for the stabilization of the international 
system to the degree that they can strengthen these economic, institutional, and normative ties 
between states.  While this situation remains more or less consistent amongst the world’s 6
industrialized democracies, some liberal theorists recognize that such cooperation is hindered 
where countries lack common values and norms, strong interweaving economic linkages, and 
a history of mutual engagement through international organizations.  7
The latter circumstance aptly describes the initial state of affairs in Russia and the 
states of the former Soviet Union, in the process highlighting the marginal usefulness of 
structural logic towards understanding Russia’s foreign policy in the region. Liberal Russian 
policy makers might hope to portray the CIS as an effective international institution with a 
strong bureaucratic infrastructure designed to preserve stability and help its members 
integrate economically with the West on the basis of their common commitment to market 
economies and pluralist democracy. In reality most observers note that, while ostensibly 
useful as a means of coordinating policy between its members, the CIS grew to function as an 
5 Bennett, ​Condemned to Repetition, ​6.  
6 See John G. Ikenberry, "Why Export Democracy?: The 'Hidden Grand Strategy' of American Foreign Policy'" 
The Wilson Quarterly (Vol. 23, no.2 (Spring 1999) 2; Roland Paris, ​At War's End: Building Peace after Civil 
Conflict​. Cambridge, U.K.: (Cambridge UP, 2004). 
7 See James M. Goldgeier and Michael McFaul, "A Tale of Two Worlds: Core and Periphery in the Post-cold 
War Era." ​International Organization​ 46, no. 2 (1992): 467-91.  
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instrument for exerting Russian hegemony in the states of the former Soviet Union.  8
Moreover, the overwhelming evidence available suggests that, while there is a certain degree 
of truth to the liberal argument that Russian “peacekeeping” interventions in the near abroad 
were designed to stabilize Russia’s turbulent periphery, the Russian government’s later 
insistence on maintaining Russian dominated missions that excluded potentially more capable 
actors, such as the United Nations (UN) and Council for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(CSCE) as well as Romania and Ukraine, suggests a more sober and strategic line of decision 
making focused on the balance of power in these geopolitically significant regions.  
The strategic goals that underlie Russia’s interventions in the near abroad appear to 
fulfill structural realist expectations regarding the incentives that anarchy creates for Moscow 
to act forcefully and decisively to retain or restore hegemony in areas of its former 
preeminence. The language of nominally liberal Russian politicians also appears to support 
this position, as President Boris Yeltsin has frequently emphasized that “geopolitics” force 
Russia to preserve a powerful presence in Eurasia.  Even Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, 9
the quintessential voice of liberal internationalism within the Russian government, noted by 
late 1993 that Russia’s refusal to intervene in conflicts in the near abroad would allow its 
“neighbors in Asia” to fill the vacuum and thus “force Russia out of the region and restrict its 
influence.”  This perspective aptly characterizes the rationale Russia ultimately championed 10
as it pursued various “peacekeeping” interventions in Moldova and Georgia, states which 
8 ​Robert H. Donaldson, and Joseph L. Nogee, ​The Foreign Policy of Russia : Changing Systems, Enduring 
Interests / Robert H. Donaldson, Joseph L. Nogee.​ 2nd ed. Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 2002. 178.  
9 Jeffrey Checkel, “Structure, Institutions, and Process: Russia's Changing Foreign Policy,”​ ​in Adeed Dawisha & 
Karen Dawisha (eds), ​The Making of Foreign Policy in Russia and the New States of Eurasia​ (Armonk, NY, 
M.E. Sharpe, 1995) 48.  
10 Quotations drawn from Kozyrev’s interview in ​Izvestiya, ​8​ ​October 1993. cited in: Fiona Hill and Pamela 
Jewett, ​"Back in the USSR": Russia's Intervention in the Internal Affairs of the Former Soviet Republics and the 
Implications United States Policy Toward Russia,​ Cambridge, MA: ​Strengthening Democratic Institutions 
Project,​ John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 1994, 9.  
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initially declined membership in the CIS, thus threatening to escape Moscow’s direct sphere 
of influence.  
Though convincing, the neorealist analysis has difficulty answering one key question: 
what, then, explains the lack of interventionist appetite in the period directly preceding and 
following the fall of the Soviet Union? For example, Kozyrev’s rhetoric in early 1992 
rejecting the use of force in the near abroad paints a far different picture than beliefs he 
expressed even just a year later. Most realist theories admit that state (and by association, 
elite) interests can change in response to the changing structure of the international system 
though they underscore the fact that long-term elite preferences are stable, rational, and 
generally unaffected by sub-state factors such as domestic or bureaucratic constraints.   11
For example, realists such as Allen Lynch point to crucial structural turning points 
such as the muted Western response to Russian intervention in Moldova (covered in more 
detail in Section three) as demonstrating to Russian moderates that the unsanctioned use of 
force to reign in the near abroad might not compromise the primary objective for liberals at 
this time: the accession of Western financial aid.  In reality this is merely an isolated, though 12
important, part of the greater picture. While this certainly was a crucial moment in the course 
of events that followed, it is not necessarily as transformative as Lynch asserts. As will be 
explored later, Yeltsin and Kozyrev both expressed lasting commitment to the liberal norms 
of non interference for months after events in Moldova transpired. It was only after 
significant domestic pressure from the anti-liberal nationalist political opposition and a series 
of independent actions taken by the military that by early 1993, Yeltsin began to express 
11 See Waltz, ​Theory of International Politics​; David Lake, ​Power, Protection and Free Trade: International 
Sources of US Commercial Strategy​, 1887-1939 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1988); Christopher 
Layne, “The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise,” ​International Security 17​ (Spring 1993). 
12 Allen C. Lynch, "The Realism of Russia's Foreign Policy," Europe-Asia Studies 53, no. 1 (2001): 14. 
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more unilateralist views and Russian policy began moving in a pragmatic, traditional 
“geopolitics” oriented direction.  
The Comparative Benefit of an Ideas-Based Approach 
There is thus a great deal of precision and specificity lost with the deterministic 
assumptions of rational and unitary state actors that realism demands. How then can this 
transition be better explained? To answer this question more substantively, it is necessary to 
turn to the domestic political, institutional, and ideational factors shaping policy in the early 
Russian Federation. This emphasis on sub-state level factors, however, should not impinge 
upon the consideration of forces at the international level as they very often directly serve to 
shape the incentives and opportunities of domestic actors involved in policy making.  To this 13
end, my work relies heavily on the historical institutionalist approach of Jeffrey Checkel, 
with particular emphasis on how these external stimuli provide institutional actors 
opportunities to press the boundaries of foreign policy choice.  
At this point it is necessary to specify what is meant by an “institution” in this 
context. Institutions, broadly defined, constitute both ​formal ​organizations as well as ​informal 
sets of norms and rules that are both historically and cognitively constructed and set the 
parameters for collective action.  In the context of political decision making, these “coercive 14
social facts” serve to constrain the activity, regularize the behavior, and shape the preferences 
of agents, given, or perhaps in spite of the fact that they exist and operate as a product of the 
normative understandings and ideas held by their constituent parts: in this case, the agents 
themselves.   15
13 Jeffrey T. Checkel, 'Structure, Institutions, and Process: Russia's Changing Foreign Policy', 48.  
14 ​Jeffrey T. Checkel, ​Ideas and International Political Change : Soviet/Russian Behavior and the End of the 
Cold War, ​New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997, 6. See also, Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States 
Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics." ​International Organization ​46, no. 2 (1992): 399.  
15 Ibid., 399.  
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To mitigate the chaos that multiple competing normative understandings of ideal 
conduct might have on the smooth institutional operations of, for example, a state, most 
organizations formulate broad “operational philosophies” that help to orient their behavior.  16
Applied to foreign policy, these operational philosophies are often expressed as national ideas 
- the broad concepts and beliefs held by foreign policy elites regarding ideal policy 
prescriptions. National ideas offer agents specific frameworks through which to define state 
interests, frame threats, and proscribe ideal policy solutions.  They also provide a benchmark 17
against which policy success is assessed and can prevent or propel the implementation of 
alternative strategies that stand to reshape the prevailing status quo assumptions.  In this 18
sense, ideational commitments can prove incredibly influential on political outcomes. 
As Checkel notes, within centralized states, potential carriers of new ideas such as 
individual “policy entrepreneurs,”  NGO’s or other transnational interest coalitions often 19
have limited access to top decision makers, allowing the “organizational ideologies” of the 
center to remain relatively insulated from unwanted ideational static.  The foreign policy 20
making apparatus of the former USSR, for example, was dominated by the operational 
philosophies of the Communist Party which included, namely, a class based understanding of 
the international system and a zero-sum approach to international politics.  The highly 21
centralized nature of this infrastructure allowed for these national ideas to dominate Soviet 
16 Jeff Legro, “What China Will Want: The Future Intentions of a Rising Power,” ​Perspectives on Politics ​Vol. 
5, No. 3, September 2007, 522.  
17 Andrew Flibbert, “The Road to Baghdad: Ideas and Intellectuals in Explanations of the Iraq War,” Security 
Studies, vol. 15, no. 2, 2006, 310.  
18 Legro, “What China Will Want: The Future Intentions of a Rising Power,” 516. 
19 As Checkel defines them, policy entrepreneurs are “purveyors of new concepts and ideologies” seeking to 
influence policy outcomes in order to maximize their individual and group interests; ​Checkel, “Ideas, 
Institutions, and the Gorbachev Foreign Policy Revolution,” ​World Politics, Vol.​ ​45 ​(2), 273 
20 ​Checkel, ​Ideas and International Political Change, 9.  
21 Although Stalin’s death and Kruschev’s “thaw” certainly signalled a reorientation of the CPSU’s operational 
philosophies, the party retained in large part their emphasis on class conflict and zero-sum interactions as the 
forces which structure the workings of the international system.  
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foreign policy making until their increasingly evident failure to achieve desired outcomes 
compelled the country’s political leadership to seek new ideas and expertise in the 
mid-1980’s.  Taking the form of Gorbachev’s “new thinking,” these new national ideas 22
remained en vogue among the Soviet political elite into the early 1990’s even as centrifugal 
forces of anti-center irredentism and ethnic conflict, themselves a partially product of new 
thinking, conspired to destabilize and ultimately dissolve the union.  
While these forces bred a degree of conservative backlash within the Soviet Union, 
the state’s centralized structure allowed for the Gorbachevian buzzwords of 
“interdependence” and “mutual security” to persist into the early post fall period.   By 23
contrast, structurally decentralized states, such as Russia post-collapse, are much more 
susceptible to the ideational uncertainty brought on by rapid structural changes or schemata 
altering political shocks, such as the sudden collapse of a multi-continental empire.  
Decentralized states are also subject to greater competition between domestic and 
bureaucratic interest groups vying for ideational influence over the policy making process. 
The seemingly disorganized and often contradictory foreign policy of the early Russian 
Federation reflects this sort of ideationally driven bureaucratic competition. Particularly from 
early-1992 to mid-1993, individual heads of certain influential power ministries (mainly the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defence) possessed considerable freedom to 
declare and pursue their opposing agendas with limited executive oversight. As the literature 
on the so-called “first image”  would suggest, the weakness and disorganization of Russia’s 24
early institutions and the fluid circumstances following the breakup of the USSR atop 
22 Checkel, “Structure, Institutions, and Process: Russia's Changing Foreign Policy,” 44.  
23 Ibid., 43.  
24 The three “images” of international relations refer to the three traditional levels of analysis, the individual, the 
state, and the international system, respectively. For full discussion of the three “images,” see Kenneth N. Waltz, 
Man, the State, and War; a Theoretical Analysis​, Topical Studies in International Relations, New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1959.  
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Yeltsin’s general tendency towards poor leadership and indecision meant that circumstances 
were ripe for lower level individuals to play a leading role in influencing policy outcomes.   25
Such situations appear well suited for Graham Allison’s bureaucratic politics model, a 
prominent organizational framework that links individuals’ interests to the organizational 
positions they hold, often encapsulated by the phrase “where you stand depends on where 
you sit.”  Put simply, bureaucrats will often prefer policies that materially benefit themselves 26
or their organization, meaning a defense minister will likely advocate for an arms buildup as 
a means to increase his state’s defence budget. While helpful for understanding the political 
implications of bureaucratic infighting, the model often overestimates the degree to which 
bureaucrats’ interests actually reflect their positions. Foreign Minister Kozyrev, for example, 
even after the unseating of key nationalist policy adversaries after Yeltsin disbanded the 
parliament in fall 1993, later began espousing decidedly nationalist policy positions, 
suggesting a change in thinking divorced from bureaucratic interest.   27
In this sense, the approach I adopt here bears a great deal in common with learning 
theory, a model drawn from social psychology which examines how actors modify their 
preferences as they acquire more knowledge.  Learning theory also emphasizes actors’ 28
cognitive ​perceptions​ of material power and the translation of these perceptions into 
outcomes as well as how outside events generate perceptions of failure or success that can 
influence the legitimacy of political coalitions and the power of those perceived responsible 
for policy outcomes.  As Andrew Bennett asserts in his exhaustive application of learning 29
25Daniel Byman and Kenneth Pollack, "Let Us Now Praise Great Men," ​International Security​ 25, no. 4 (2001): 
140-143.  
26 Graham Allison, ​Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis​ (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971), 
176.  
27 Bennett, ​Condemned to Repetition, ​65.  
28 Ibid.,​ ​81. 
29 Bennett, ​Condemned to Repetition​, 71. For similar application of the learning-coalitional model, see also​ Jack 
L. Snyder, ​Myths of Empire : Domestic Politics and International Ambition / Jack Snyder,​ Cornell Studies in 
Security Affairs. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991. 
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theory to Russo-Soviet interventionism, ruling coalitions often lose legitimacy and can be 
removed from power when their ideas become associated with failed policy outcomes.  This 30
highlights the fact that while material resources can and often do determine the relative 
strength and influence of constituent bureaucracies, lessons learned by perceived failures and 
successes are in some cases even more crucial towards maintaining policy legitimacy. 
 Checkel furthers this claim, arguing that even if policy crisis does not cause 
coalitional change to occur immediately, such situations nonetheless serve to benefit select 
ideational camps by creating “policy windows” through which aspiring policy entrepreneurs 
forwarding a set of replacement ideas might jump.  These windows often occur during 31
periods of flux that allow ideas to play key role in determining the relative influence of 
domestic interest groups competing for policy leverage. As Jeff Legro argues, the opening of 
a policy window following the “delegitimation” of previously dominant ideas might not 
always lead to immediate policy change, as there must be sufficient consensus surrounding a 
potential replacement.  In fact, if there exists a multitude of replacement ideas poised to 32
unseat the status quo, continuity should prove more likely than change. If, however, there 
exists a singular set of replacement ideas and those ideas generate perceivably desirable 
results, then long term change becomes likely.  33
In the context of the late Soviet and Early Russian period, this process of policy crisis, 
delegitimation, policy window opening, and idea reconsideration occurred in three major 
stages: the first was Gorbachev’s pursuit of “new thinking” following the policy window 
opened by the evident failures of a zero-sum foreign policy in Afghanistan and the stagnation 
30Bennett, ​Condemned to Repetition​,​ ​79.  
31 Jeffery T. Checkel,“Ideas, Institutions, and the Gorbachev Foreign Policy Revolution.” World Politics, vol. 
45, no. 02, 1993, 273; cited in: Cashman, Greg, and Leonard C Robinson, ​An Introduction to the Causes of War: 
Patterns of Interstate Conflict from World War I to Iraq​, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2007, 356.  
32 Legro, “What China Will Want: The Future Intentions of a Rising Power,” 524.  
33 Ibid., 523-524. 
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of the autarkic Soviet planned economy in the mid-1980’s. In this case, the traditionalist ideas 
of the CPSU, delegitimated by the crises they caused, were traded in exchange for more 
liberal internationalist orientations towards foreign and economic policy. The second stage 
was the initial preservation of these liberal internationalist ideas following the collapse of the 
USSR and attempts by bureaucratic actors to demonstrate the value of these integrationist 
ideas by implementing them to achieve desirable results. The third stage was the eventual 
delegitimation of these liberal ideas by intervening structural, domestic, and institutional 
factors and events that signalled a collapse of the liberal platform, opening a policy window 
for revanchist policy entrepreneurs seeking a partial return to the zero-sum policy of the Cold 
War era. It is to this third stage of developments that the thrust of my argument and scope of 
this project is devoted. The following section will involve a closer examination of the third 
stage as well as the aforementioned factors and events involved in shaping the development 














Chapter Two - The Foreign Policy Debate in the Early Russian Federation 
In the early post-Soviet period, the struggle between Russian foreign policy elites to 
formulate a unitary approach to peacekeeping and intervention in the near abroad can be 
viewed in the context of their broader search for a reliable and comprehensive foreign policy 
strategy. Factors that affect and influence this debate largely concern the defense of Russia’s 
so-called national interests which, though varied and circumstantial, traditionally include 
ensuring domestic stability and territorial integrity, retaining the largely inherited geopolitical 
position of the Soviet Union, and preventing the emergence of expansionist regional 
hegemons in Europe, South Asia, and the Far East that might encroach upon regions of 
traditional Russian influence.  In this context, the emergent ethnic conflicts throughout 34
Russia’s near abroad become the litmus test for Russia’s ability to actively defend these 
interests in the face of perceived anti-Russian adversity.  
Russia’s responses to these interests are, however, by no means universal or 
prescribed. Particularly in the years 1992-1994, domestic resolve on questions of national 
security and, more specifically, policy towards the “near abroad,” was determined at least 
partially by the orientation of the ruling coalition that became dominant within the country’s 
political elite hierarchy. During this period of time, three main groups are seen as vying for 
power within the Russian Federation’s political field: liberal internationalists (isolationists), 
centrist nationalists (pragmatists), and radical nationalists (neo-imperialists).  Though these 35
34 Bruce Parrott, ​State Building and Military Power in Russia and the New States of Eurasia / Editor, Bruce 
Parrott, The International Politics of Eurasia​ ; v. 5. Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1995, 84.  
35 These classifications and their parenthetical counterparts represent a conglomeration of a handful of different 
authors’ typologies for distinguishing between factions and coalitions within the Russian parliament and foreign 
policy making apparatus. They are consolidated and slightly modified here for the sake of clarity. For alternative 
frameworks for examining these schools of thought, see: Malcom et. al., ​Internal Factors in Russian Foreign 
Policy​, Oxford, England ; New York: Published for the Royal Institute of International Affairs by Oxford 
University Press, 1996;​ ​Parrott, ​State Building and Military Power in Russia and the New States of Eurasia​, 
84-85; Bennett, ​Condemned to Repetition,​ 305-309; Dov Lynch, ​Russian Peacekeeping Strategies in the CIS: 
the Cases of Moldova, Georgia and Tajikistan​, St. Martin's Press in Association with the Royal Institute of 
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groups lack definite homogeneity and contain members who proved prone to abrupt or 
unexpected reversals of position, this framework provides a useful benchmark for classifying 
the schools of thought characterizing the foreign policy debate in the early years of the 
Russian Federation. The individual prescriptions of each major grouping are compiled below.  
Liberal Internationalists  
Commonly classified as “liberal isolationists” or “liberal confederationists,” members 
of this group often viewed the weakness of Russia and the other post-Soviet states as a result 
of incompletely implemented democratic and free market reforms.  They thus prioritized 36
further integration with the West by demonstrating a shared regard for international law, 
democratic norms, and neoliberal economic institutions based on both pragmatic aims to 
secure western financial aid and new normative understandings of international relations 
following the conclusion of the Cold War.  Likewise, members of this group saw Russia’s 37
continued provision of centralized subsidies to the constellation of economically weak and 
increasingly conflict stricken states in the “near abroad” as not only an obstacle to this 
objective, but a tremendous economic burden that Russia could not afford to maintain.   38
Nevertheless, they more or less assumed that the countries of the near abroad would 
remain close to Russia and offered little by way of a security strategy in the region beyond 
insisting that the international community recognize Russia’s “special interests” in these 
areas. Absent this recognition, the liberal internationalists still rejected outright the use of 39
International Affairs, Russia and Eurasia Programme, 2000, 42-45; Alexander Pikayev, ​Peacekeeping and the 
Role of Russia in Eurasia,​ Edited by Lena Jonson and Clive Archer, Westview Press, 1996. 51-66.  
36 Bennett, ​Condemned to Repetition, ​306-307.  
37 Lynch, ​Russian Peacekeeping Strategies in the CIS, ​43.  
38 Pikayev, ​Peacekeeping and the Role of Russia in Eurasia,​ 51; Estimations of subsidies paid to CIS member 
states in 1991 amounted to nearly $17 billion. Accounting for purchasing power parity given the weakness of 
the ruble in comparison to the dollar at the time, these transfers comprised approximately 10 percent of Russia’s 
gross domestic product (GDP).  
39 ​Donaldson and Nogee, ​The Foreign Policy of Russia, ​190. This assertion was not made by Kozyrev but rather 
by his first deputy foreign minister, Fedor Shelov-Kovediaev in a report entitled “Strategy and Tactics of 
Russian Foreign Policy in the New Abroad.” In the early days of 1992, Shelov-Kovediaev was the individual to 
whom chief responsibility for contact with the near abroad within the Foreign Ministry was initially entrusted.  
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force as a viable instrument of policy in the near abroad on the grounds that it would 
compromise Russia’s integration into the club of G-7 powers, on which Russia remained 
deeply dependent financially well into the late 1990’s.  The liberal internationalist view was 40
thus that diplomatic conflict resolution could constitute a positive-sum interaction wherein 
cooperation with international institutions might generate outcomes that could prove mutually 
beneficial to both Russia and the West.  Prominent liberal internationalists included Deputy 41
Prime Minister Yeigor Gaidar, Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, and President Boris 
Yeltsin, the latter two of whom shifted steadily to more centrist nationalist views by 1994.  
Centrist Nationalists 
The centrist nationalists - or “pragmatists,” as they are sometimes called - subscribed 
to views on Russian Foreign policy broadly compatible with Western notions of “defensive 
realism,” viewing stability in the “near abroad” as crucial to Russia’s internal security and 
revitalization.  Rejecting the overly optimistic views of the liberal internationalists as 42
“romantic wishful thinking,” the pragmatists argued that excessive focus on normative goals 
over national interests would risk sacrificing the latter to potentially disastrous effect.  They 43
therefore proposed a strategy of limited engagement in the near abroad, concerned for both 
the defence of Russians and Russian speakers as a practical matter of limiting migration from 
the FSU and for maintaining Russia’s key economic and security interests there.  To this 44
end, they sought limited yet pragmatic cooperation with Western powers and institutions in 
order to gain international recognition as a “peacekeeper” in the near abroad and also limit 
blowback from the West and potential anti-Russian balancing in the near abroad. They 
40 Lynch, "The Realism of Russia's Foreign Policy," 7.  
41 Bennett, ​Condemned to Repetition,​ 307.  
42 Lynch, ​Russian Peacekeeping Strategies in the CIS, ​44.  
43 ‘​Die auβenpolitische Debatte in Ruβland: Ruβland un der Unstrukturierte postsowjetische Raum’, ​in 
International Politik und Gesellschaft, no.4, 1995, 263; cited in Svante E. Cornell, ​Small Nations and Great 
Powers, A Study of Ethno-political Conflict in the Caucasus, ​UK:Curzon Press, 2001, 336.  
44 Bennett, ​Condemned to Repetition,​ 307.  
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ultimately believed, that Russia’s retention of Great Power status relied on its ability to 
preserve uncontested preeminence in the former Soviet space and thus were hesitant to allow 
international institutions a broad mandate to determine the terms of conflict resolution at the 
expense of Russian geostrategic interests.  Key members included State Counsellor Sergei 45
Stankevich, Presidential Council member Andranik Migranyan, as well as various members 
of the Supreme Soviet.  
Radical Nationalists  
Members of this diverse group of communists and hardline neo-imperialists widely 
lamented the Soviet collapse and were openly skeptical of, if not hostile towards, Western aid 
programs, which they viewed as a conspiracy aimed at weakening the Russian economy.46
They urged the defence of ethnic Russians and wished to aggressively assert Russia’s 
preeminence in the FSU, demonstrating a ready willingness to use force to prevent a domino 
effect of anti-Russian regimes spreading throughout the near abroad.  They in turn strongly 47
opposed joint peacekeeping operations with non-CIS powers or international organizations, 
fueled by concerns that Western powers might use their considerable influence within these 
organizations to secure their victory in the Cold War by establishing a Western sphere of 
influence in the FSU that would pose a direct threat to Russian security interests.  Notable 48
members included Vice President Alexander Rutskoi, Defence Minister Pavel Grachev, as 
well as the coalition between communists and extreme nationalists in parliament, often 
referred to as the Red-Brown coalition, which dominated the opposition against Yeltsin 
throughout much of 1992 and 1993. 
 
45 Bennett, ​Condemned to Repetition, ​307. 
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Domestic and Institutional Sources of Russian Foreign Policy Making  
Though varied, the primary sources of foreign policy making during these years 
remained largely contingent on the actions of an array of decentralized and competing 
ministries with limited horizontal coordination. As such, the President retained, for the most 
part, a large deal of central authority, much of which was bolstered in the realm of foreign 
policy making through Yeltsin’s creation of the Security Council and dismemberment of the 
Supreme Soviet in the spring and fall of 1993. Nevertheless, the official position of the 
Kremlin during this period is often difficult to ascertain if not downright contradictory. 
President Yeltsin exhibited varying adherence to each of the various schools of thought, a 
circumstance owing at least partially to aspects of his personality. Often relying on 
contradictory information from competing sources, Yeltsin often gathered information in a 
characteristically informal fashion and displayed a strong propensity for emotionally charged 
and impulsive decision making.  This personal inconsistency coupled with the institutional 49
decentralization of the early Russian state intensely politicized the foreign policy making 
process and fostered a great deal of competition among opposing bureaucratic institutions and 
foreign policy elites for influence over the president and his inner circle, particularly in the 
first few years after he assumed office.  
Yeltsin was thus at first a very strong proponent of the liberal internationalist agenda 
forwarded by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), the primary instrument of Russian 
foreign policy making in the early months of 1992. Largely a hold over from the Soviet-era 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Russian MFA possessed a less formalized operational 
philosophy and was less ideologically insulated than other more conservative Russian 
decision making bodies, leaving it more receptive to new ideas, particularly the brand of 
49 Bennett, ​Condemned to Repetition,​ 302.  
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liberal internationalism heralded by Foreign Minister Kozyrev.  Kozyrev helped bolster the 50
flow of liberal ideas into the Foreign Ministry by creating a deputy staff drawn more from 
academia than the staffs of the Soviet period and by actively seeking advice and expertise 
from German and American research universities.  Though this helped stimulate the flow of 51
ideas and expertise designed to smooth Russia’s integration into the capitalist world 
community, the MFA conspicuously lacked information on the near abroad. Though the 
ministry had an array of area specialists on, say, Japan or India, they all but lacked experts on 
Kazakhstan or Armenia, for example, for the sole reason that, until December 1991, these 
places were not foreign countries.  This partially explains the MFA’s initial mismanagement 52
and benign neglect of relations with the near abroad that partially led to the liberals’ eventual 
delegitimation.  
As the MFA waned in influence and prominence towards late 1992 and early 1993, 
the initially weakened Ministry of Defense (MoD) and its concomitant intelligence agencies 
increasingly consolidated power from the immediate post-Soviet period into 1994.  This rise 53
to prominence was strengthened by Yeltsin’s strategic alliance with the key members of the 
Russian military. In contrast to the Foreign Ministry, the military and Defence Ministry 
remained insulated from the liberalizing effects of “new thinking” and possessed 
organizational ideologies largely indistinguishable from those held by their predecessors.  54
Thus, the general policy preference among the military preference within the military at the 
time was firmly in favor of the nationalists.  Furthermore, as Yeltsin’s popularity waned in 55
50 Checkel, “Structure, Institutions, and Process: Russia's Changing Foreign Policy,” 51-52.  
51 Ibid., 52.  
52 Thomas De Waal, ​Black Garden : Armenia and Azerbaijan through Peace and War / Thomas De Waal, 
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53 Lynch, ​Russian Peacekeeping Strategies in the CIS, ​49.  
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response to the emergent failures of the liberal internationalist position in late 1992, he began 
granting the MoD a more or less unilateral hand in directing military reform, determining 
military doctrine, and dictating security policy towards the near abroad.  This alliance would 56
ultimately bear fruit for Yeltsin following the constitutional crisis of October 1993, when his 
military-backed attack on parliament allowed him to neutralize key members of his 
opposition in parliament and dissolve the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation.  57
Alongside the military’s rise was the reorganization of several former branches of the 
KGB into a new array of intelligence organizations. In a manner much akin to his alliance 
with the military, Yeltsin sought to co-opt the support of these intelligence organizations in 
order to bolster his domestic political control and aid in his struggle against political 
opponents.  Primary among these was the Foreign Intelligence Service (FIS) which, under 58
the fiery leadership of Yevgeni Primakov, became a crucial rival to the MFA as a driver of 
policy and a source of intelligence on the near abroad.  Another important body was the 59
Federal Counterintelligence Service (FSK), which was reported to have acted as the primary 
director of Russian covert operations in the near abroad, specifically in supplying arms to 
combatants in Abkhazia as well as in Chechnya.  Among others, the Main Intelligence 60
Directorate (GRU) reportedly supported two separate coup attempts in Azerbaijan while the 
Federal Border Guards Service (FPS) had, by 1994, troops deployed in Moldova, Tajikistan, 
and Abkhazia.   61
56 Lynch, ​Russian Peacekeeping Strategies in the CIS, ​10.  
57 Bennett, ​Condemned to Repetition, ​303.  
58 ​Donaldson and Nogee, ​The Foreign Policy of Russia, ​157. 
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Although ultimately dissolved by Yeltsin in October 1993, the Supreme Soviet, under 
the influence of speaker Ruslan Khasbulatov and the anti-Yeltsin Red-Brown coalition, 
exercised a considerable deal of influence over foreign affairs under the pre-1993 
constitution.  The parliamentary Committees on Security and Defence and on International 62
Affairs and Foreign Economic Relations, though generally more moderate than the general 
membership, were nonetheless sharply critical of the liberal international ambitions of the 
President and MFA which they saw as betraying Russia’s national interests.  While 63
somewhat limited in their executive decision making capacity, the nationalists in the Supreme 
Soviet proved successful in stoking popular opposition to Yeltsin and in a number of cases 
used their legislative power to overtly obstruct attempts by Yeltsin to resolve issues, such as 
the withdrawal of troops from conflict zones, through strictly executive means. Their 
assertiveness demonstrated further the degree of political decentralization that the new 
Russian Federation was prone to in the early years of its existence that contributed to the 
confusion in policy articulation.  
Another key source of influence, though their direct bearing on policy making is 
admittedly limited, is the Russian public. Particularly regarding relations with the near 
abroad, many ethnic Russians were disillusioned with the geopolitical realities left by the 
breakup of the USSR and remained so for a number of reasons. First, and perhaps most 
importantly, following the union’s collapse, some twenty-five million people of 
self-proclaimed Russian descent found themselves living outside their country’s borders.  64
Moreover, many Russians simply refuse to regard these newly internationalized borders as 
legitimate, given the common tendency for Soviet citizens and industrial planners to view the 
62 Lynch, ​Russian Peacekeeping Strategies in the CIS,​ 40.  
63 Bennett, C​ondemned to Repetition, ​304.  
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Soviet Union’s borders as internal and largely arbitrary. For this reason, many Russians 
tended to view Moscow’s relations with the near abroad as issues of domestic rather than 
foreign policy.  These factors, alongside the increasingly disastrous impact of Gaidar’s 65
economic “shock therapy” on public welfare, facilitated strong public support for nationalist 
positions, as evinced by the overwhelming victory of radical nationalists such as Vladimir 
Zhirinovsky’s Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) in the December 1993 
parliamentary elections. 
 Ultimately, the debate over policy towards the near abroad fundamentally regards 
contentious questions of identity, national sovereignty, and the nature of the new Russian 
Federation’s relationship with the former Russian Empire and Soviet republics. Though the 
relevant schools of thought diverged greatly in their broader policy prescriptions they 
remained united in their conviction that Russia is an erstwhile great power with a 
responsibility to contain the spread of conflict throughout Russia’s strategic border region. As 
the following historical narratives will attest, a constructivist analysis of Russian intervention 
from 1992-1994 demonstrates that while the incidence of Russian intervention often occurred 
spontaneously, the onset of structural, domestic, and institutional pressures helped 
ideologically driven policy entrepreneurs build a national consensus framing intervention as 
an instrument of coercive diplomacy and empowering pragmatic nationalist views on 
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Chapter Three - Soviet Nationalities Policy  
Before turning to the conflicts themselves, it is first crucial to understand how the 
politics of ethnicity in the Soviet Union were formalized and institutionalized and how the 
breakdown of these arrangements in the late 1980’s created ideal conditions for the 
nationalist irredentism and civil conflict that ultimately warranted outside intervention. A 
system that originally began as a response to the so called “Nationalities Question,” Soviet 
nationalities policy has its roots in pre-revolutionary Russia. Until its collapse in 1917, the 
Russian Empire was essentially a massive and contiguous land empire which traditionally 
relied on brute force to maintain order on its multi-ethnic southern and eastern peripheries. 
The leaders of the Bolshevik movement thus understood well that popular fervor for the 
principle of “national self-determination” rendered nationalism a powerful weapon against 
the increasingly frail imperial center.  Although Marxism generally rejects the fundamental 66
assumptions of nationalism by holding that economic class, rather than the nation, constitutes 
the primary cleavage between human societies, the Bolsheviks were extremely successful in 
harnessing the inertia of the preexisting nationalist movements throughout Russia’s periphery 
to weaken the power of the Tsar and Provisional Government and generate support for 
socialism. 
Following the success of the revolution, however, the impending disintegration of the 
Russian Empire necessitated a new, more formalized answer to the nationalities question that 
could satiate popular demands for self-determination while also maintaining the cohesiveness 
of the state. Soviet decision makers thus decided upon a federative system according to the 
“national-territorial principle,” providing each major nationality with a territorial homeland, 
66 ​Victor Zaslavsky, "Success and Collapse: Traditional Soviet Nationality Policy," in Ian Bremmer and Ray 
Taras, eds., Nations and Politics in the Soviet Successor States, Cambridge University Press, 1993,​ 30.  
 
Vidal 27 
whether in one of the fifteen union republics, twenty autonomous republics, eight 
autonomous oblasts, or eight autonomous ​okrugs​.  Thus, when the first All-Union-Treaty 67
was ratified in 1922, the organizational structure of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
constituted a voluntary federative union of semi-autonomous ethno-states. At least initially, 
these nationality units were granted considerable freedom under Lenin’s policy of 
“indigenization” (​korenizatsiya​), retaining the right to practice their traditional religions, 
speak their indigenous languages, and enjoy a considerable degree of local autonomy. The 
implicit assumption remained, however, that national attachments and loyalties would 
eventually dissipate in favor of a supranational Soviet identity, facilitated by the eventual 
construction of a fully integrated political and economic community.   68
Such cohesiveness being unforthcoming in the Soviet Union’s early years, Stalin’s 
rise to power signalled a much more forceful push towards centralization and Sovietization 
which would radically alter the future course and tenor of Soviet nationalities policy. Various 
republics and autonomous regions were either administratively demoted or underwent 
arbitrary territorial alterations and a vast array of minority ethnic groups suffered systematic 
persecution and forcible resettlement through the period during and after World War II.  In 69
place of Lenin’s platform of “indigenization” came a forcible Russification campaign aimed 
at culturally and linguistically uniting the disparate populations of the USSR while also 
discouraging irredentist sentiment at the national unit level. In principle, these policies aimed 
to institute a ​divide et impera ​approach to mitigating ethnic unrest and mobilizing the whole 
of the Soviet populace towards industrialization, modernization, and the building of 
socialism. In practice, however, they served to stoke and suppress deep inter-ethnic 
67 Philip G Roeder, “Soviet Federalism and Ethnic Mobilization,” World Politics, 43, 2 (Jan. 1991): 203-204. 
Italics theirs.  
68 ​Gail W. Lapidus, "Gorbachev's Nationalities Problem," ​Foreign Affairs,​ Vol. 64, No. 4 (Fall 1989), ​432-433.  
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grievances, fuel resentment for central authority, and ultimately set the stage for future ethnic 
conflict. The latter of these was accomplished in large part by institutionalization of 
nationality as an inescapable aspect of identity for Soviet citizens.  
Beginning with the introduction of the Soviet passport system in 1932, the 
bureaucratic registration of ethnicity became the centerpiece of Soviet ethnopolitics and 
would grow to define citizen-state relationships in the decades following. Citizens were 
initially given the option to nationally self identify but were soon denied that right, leaving 
the determination of one’s official nationality to the entries of their parents, rendering 
ascriptive and immutable a phenomenon widely regarded as a product of conscious 
self-identification.  The Soviet leadership justified this decision on the basis of guaranteeing 70
special rights to ethnic minorities residing in their ethnic homelands through a system of 
institutionalized affirmative action policies. This system was designed to provide preferential 
treatment to these “titular nationalities” by granting them elevated access to opportunities in 
higher education and professional employment within their homelands.   71
It also functioned as a form of ensuring centralized control over otherwise potentially 
restive territorially based nationalities. Since roughly the 1950’s, each ethnic homeland was 
ruled by indigenous ethnic cadre drawn from the ranks of that region’s titular nationality that 
was granted a monopoly over the republic’s mobilizational resources.  An institutionalized 72
incentive structure then served to deter indigenous cadres from pursuing potentially 
destabilizing primordial ethnic agendas, while the ethnically distinct institutional 
stratification system functionally excluded external ethnic entrepreneurs.  All of these factors 73
70 Zaslavsky, ​"Success and Collapse: Traditional Soviet Nationality Policy," ​34.  
71 Roeder, “Soviet Federalism and Ethnic Mobilization,” 207.  
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served to foster the construction of an educated national elite within each republic that was 
inherently and inextricably bound to the Soviet center, an arrangement which, under 
conditions of steady economic development, ensured considerable stability.  
Though Stalin’s death in 1953 and the resulting, albeit brief, period of reformism 
under Khrushchev saw Moscow grant limited reparations to formerly persecuted minorities, 
the fundamental design of the Soviet ethno-political infrastructure remained intact through 
the Brezhnev era. It was not until the deepening of the Soviet Union’s economic crises in the 
1980’s and subsequent introduction of social and economic reforms under Mikhail 
Gorbachev that the system’s safeguards began to unravel. While Gorbachev himself admitted 
to the influence of ​perestroika​ in “explod[ing] the illusory peace and harmony which reigned 
during the years of stagnation,” it was ​glasnost ​that truly brought the nationalities problem to 
the forefront of politics in the Soviet Union.   74
Roughly translatable to “openness” or “transparency,” ​glasnost​ was a political slogan 
referring to an array of policy programs broadly associated with the loosening of censorship 
restrictions, allowing the Soviet public, media, and intelligentsia to discuss and investigate 
issues previously considered taboo.  Though Gorbachev justified this new openness as a 75
means to create a less restricted civil society and more invigorated national dialogue, the 
leadership’s virulent condemnation and reexamination of the horrors of Stalinism allowed 
previously submerged ethnic grievances to reemerge, particularly among the educated ethnic 
elites of the Union Republics.  
These seeds of instability were given a chance to grow with the introduction of 
“democratization,” the program of political liberalization that quickly became the centerpiece 
74 From Gorbachev’s 29 November 1988 address to Supreme Soviet; cited in Richard Sakwa, ​Gorbachev and 
his Reforms: 1985-1990, ​New York: Prentice Hall, 1990,​ ​257. 
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of the ​glasnost​ reform platform in 1988. As preexisting restrictions against mass public 
demonstrations and unofficially operated organizations were lifted and the center began 
encouraging a freer and more independent press, a vast array of popular movements were 
initiated, many of which revolved around issues of ethnic identity and shared grievances.  76
Particularly in the union republics, these movements functioned as quasi political parties and 
local authorities often began developing close ties with the so called “Popular Fronts” that 
appeared in republics such as Moldova, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and the Baltic States.  
Ultimately, these political changes, alongside the exacerbation of economic issues that 
began to culminate in the late 1980’s disrupted the chain of authority between Moscow and 
its ethnic cadres in the union republics, allowing the latter to pursue popular programs 
without fear of reprisal from the center. Absent the repressiveness of traditional Soviet rule 
and its limited affordance of political rights, open channels of communication, and mobility 
within and between its ethnic provinces, the leaders of these newly formed popular 
movements, particularly those within ethnically heterogeneous Soviet SSRs, were finally 
given the opportunity to address preexisting grievances and petition for change. As the 
following case studies will attest, understanding the development of these movements proves 
crucial towards understanding the conflicts they bred and the responses those conflicts 










Chapter Four - Moldova: Transnistria 
The brief civil war that erupted in the Republic of Moldova constitutes the first active 
deployment of Russian troops in the near abroad in the post-Soviet period. It also retains 
significance as among the first foreign policy decisions made unilaterally by the newly 
created Russian military to which the civilian government was compelled to acquiesce. 
Despite the absence of the central Russian government from the decision making process, the 
outcome of the war was crucial both in securing key Russian interests and shaping domestic 
resolve on Russia’s role in ethnic conflicts on its periphery and ultimately its approach to the 
near abroad writ large.  
Historical Background 
Situated on the banks of the Dniester river, the area currently known as the Republic 
of Moldova has a limited history of territorial sovereignty. In its original formation, the 
medieval principality of Moldavia stretched from the Carpathian mountains to the east bank 
of the Dniester, representing the bulk of Romania’s current territory. The advance of the 
Ottoman empire in the sixteenth century subjected the majority Romanian speaking peasant 
population to centuries of Turkish occupation and established the Dniester as the natural 
border with Russia, which began a military occupation of the river’s east bank in 1792.  The 77
portion of Moldova located east of the Dniester river and west of the Prut, more recently 
referred to as Bessarabia, remained under Ottoman control until it was annexed by Russia in 
1812.  Forced internal migration radically changed the population of Bessarabia to reflect a 78
77 Stuart J. Kaufman, ​Modern Hatreds : The Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War / Stuart J. Kaufman,​ Cornell 
Studies in Security Affairs. Ithaca [NY]: Cornell University Press, 2001,​ 131. The conquest of Transnistria is 
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capital of Tiraspol, a physical reminder of the longstanding Russian influence in the east bank region.  
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newly diverse ethnic makeup consisting of Jews, Ukrainians, and Russians in the cities and 
townships of the region, dwarfing demographically the ethnic Moldovans, who were 
concentrated heavily in the countryside.  
Meanwhile, as the ​Gubernia​ of Bessarabia grew more Russified, the remainder of old 
Moldavia joined with Wallachia in 1859 to form the first Romanian state. Though the 
Romanian-speaking populations in Romania and Bessarabia developed their modern ethnic 
identities under distinctly different cultural conditions, the chaos of the Russian civil war 
provided Romania with the opportunity to lay claim on its Romanian speaking neighbor to 
the east. The 1918 territorial transferral declaring that Bessarabia belonged “historically and 
territorially to Romania,” recognized by the Western powers at the Paris Peace conference in 
1920, began the two-decade long period of Romanian rule over Bessarabia.  The strip of 79
land along the western bank of the Dniester has by contrast, no history of territorial union 
with Romania, aside from a brief wartime occupation from 1941-1944. In what ultimately 
constituted a response to Bessarabia’s merger with Romania, Stalin reorganized the east bank 
region into the “Moldavian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic,” which functioned from 
1924-1940 as an administrative subunit of the Ukrainian SSR before being incorporated into 
the newly created Moldavian SSR, created during the Soviet occupation of Bessarabia 
following the 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact with Nazi Germany.   80
Moldova and Transnistria under the Soviet Union 
Though forestalled temporarily by Nazi invasion in 1941 and subsequent Romanian 
occupation, the reincorporation of Bessarabia into the MSSR allowed for the full 
Sovietization of the Dniester-Prut region. Transnistria, however, already having undergone 
79 ​Stuart J. Kaufman, "Spiraling to Ethnic War: Elites, Masses, and Moscow in Moldova's Civil War," 
International Security​ 21, no. 2 (1996): ​120.  
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the transformative effects of collectivization and Stalin’s five-year-plans during the 1920’s 
and 1930’s, maintained privileged status within the post-war MSSR, far exceeding the west 
bank region in its industrial productivity and close party-based affiliations with Moscow. 
Although it only accounted for twelve percent of the Republic’s territory, Transnistria 
became a crucial base for the Soviet defense and heavy industry sectors, employing nearly 80 
percent of its population in the industrial, construction, and service sectors in the years 
following the second world war.  Communist party members hailing from the MASSR also 81
retained dominance in Moldova’s post-war power apparatus practically throughout the Soviet 
period, fueling tensions between the “Moscow communists,” often times ethnic Russians and 
Ukrainians, and the “home communists,” leaders from the Bessarabian communist 
underground deemed politically suspect by Moscow.  Thus, by the 1960’s, two thirds of 82
Moldova’s Communist party members were either Russian or Ukrainian.  83
As an important industrial powerhouse ruled by an increasingly urbanized and 
centre-loyal party elite, Transnistria was home to a far more demographically diverse 
population than the remainder of Moldova. According to the 1989 census, Moldovans 
represented 39.9 percent of Transnistria’s 546,000 inhabitants, Ukrainians following with 
28.3 percent and Russians, 25.5 percent.  These figures appear to suggest the demographic 84
dominance of ethnic Moldovans, although they worked mainly in agriculture and comprised 
only a small fraction of Transnistria’s urban population which itself was considerably more 
Russophone. Russians remained a minority in Transnistria’s industrial cities, whereas 
Russian speakers comprised nearly 75 percent of the urban population, in comparison with 
81 ​Charles King, ​ The Moldovans: Romania, Russia, and the Politics of Culture,​ Stanford: Hoover Institution 
Press, 2000, ​183.  
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the 35 percent of Moldova’s population they represented as a whole.  This Russophone 85
population was thus deeply and quintessentially Soviet and maintained practically inseverable 
ties with the Soviet center, the Communist Party, and, above all, the military, whose heavy 
presence in Transnistria via the Soviet Fourteenth Army was central to the economic and 
social life of the region.  86
The remainder of Moldova, however, though reaping partially the benefits of 
Transnistria’s industrial productivity, remained largely rural and underdeveloped. 
Disproportionately consolidated in the poorer agricultural sector, ethnic Moldovans were 
vastly underrepresented in administrative and industry related professions. In fact, by 1977, 
non-Moldovans constituted roughly 54 percent of the industrial workforce, 57 percent of state 
leadership positions, and 68 percent of those employed in the sciences.  The stagnation of 87
the Soviet economy during the 1980’s exacerbated Moldova’s already dire economic 
situation, particularly following Gorbachev’s anti-alcohol campaign, a central planning error 
which proved disastrous for Moldova’s agricultural industry given its heavy reliance on the 
production of wine as a staple export.  Thus, by the late 1980’s, ethnic Moldovans were 88
progressively forced into competition with non-Moldovans for an increasingly limited pool of 
state issued jobs and benefits.  
Political Mobilization Under Glasnost 
 In light of these worsening economic circumstances, alongside grim realities of 
ethnic favoritism ingrained in the social fabric of the republic, ​glasnost’s​ “opening” of the 
political arena to non-centrally-sanctioned organizations was a driving force behind the 
85 Jeff Chinn, ​Peacekeeping and the Role of Russia in Eurasia,​ Edited by Lena Jonson and Clive Archer, 
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conflict spiral that unfurled between Chisinau and Tiraspol. The emergence of a strong 
nationalist popular front successfully framed the republic’s socio-economic ills in explicitly 
ethnic terms, garnering considerable support in the process. Despite its beginnings in early 
1988 as the Communist Party affiliated and initially pro-Gorbachev Democratic Movement in 
Support of Perestroika, the organization known as the Moldovan Popular Front by mid-1989 
proved successful in mobilizing multiple hundred thousand person crowds, gathered with the 
intention of forwarding an ethnic Moldovan agenda.  Among the primary demands of the 89
MPF was the institutionalization of Moldovan as the state language.   90
This demand was politically charged as it stood to disenfranchise the whole of the 
Russophone population from their traditionally dominant position in Moldovan society. The 
implications were considerable; place names and public signage were to be changed, 
Moldovan would replace Russian as the language of government and industry, and, perhaps 
most importantly, all political leaders, managers, and service workers were given five years 
to obtain full bilingualism.  While certain provisions for exemption were afforded to 91
Russophone concentrated areas, the language law nonetheless inspired mass opposition as 
Russian speakers from cities throughout both Transnistria and Bessarabia mobilized in 
protest. It was the Transnistrian elites, however, whom these laws most acutely threatened. 
The goal of the Transnistrian elites was primarily to create a security dilemma for 
both sides in order to preserve and increase their own power. In Transnistria, these elites were 
largely composed of the ​raion​ executive committees and the coordinating committees of 
industrial concerns who coalesced around the leader of the opposition movement, Igor 
89 Kaufman, ​Modern Hatreds,​ 139.  
90Ibid., 135. The history of the Moldovan language is contested. Although grammatically and lexically a dialect 
of Romanian, the Moldovan that was standardized after WWII was strongly positioned by the Soviet leadership 
as a separate language, noticeably distinct from Romanian in its use of the Cyrillic alphabet and inclusion of 
various Russian loanwords. These claims, however, are denied by pro-Romanian Moldovan intellectuals that 
consider them part of a greater Soviet campaign to isolate Moldovans from their ethnic brethren.  
91 Ibid., 146.  
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Smirnov.  A recent emigre to Moldova from Ukraine, Smirnov used his position as an 92
industrial manager to ride the tide of anti-Moldovan sentiment in his city of Tiraspol and in 
August 1989 was elected to the chair of the United Council of Work Collectives (OSTK in 
the Russian acronym), the body in charge of organizing workers’ strikes.  The OSTK was 93
extremely influential in mobilizing on-the-ground support for the Russophone agenda, 
organizing the January 1990 referendum on Transnistrian autonomy in which nearly 96 
percent of respondents voted in favor of greater Transnistrian autonomy and, if necessary, the 
establishment of an entirely independent Transnistrian Republic.  This was but the first 94
among a series of increasingly provocative actions taken by the east bank leadership in 
response to increasing chauvinism in the west.  
Escalation of Hostilities and the Outbreak of Violence 
Tensions between Chisinau and Tiraspol were solidified following the 25 February 
1990 parliamentary elections, as a result of which various nationalist representatives from the 
Popular Front gained a majority in Parliament.  This victory occurred amidst increasingly 95
frequent calls in Chisinau for closer ties between Moldova and Romania and open 
consideration of a full territorial merger. Though such plans were widely opposed by 
pro-Moldovan-independence factions, including President Mircea Snegur, the pro-Romanian 
factions in parliament succeeded in exacerbating fears amongst the Russophone population of 
Transnistria of being forcibly reincorporated into Romania.  Such fears fueled the 2 96
September 1990 decision by a local council of Transnistrian authorities to declare a separate 
92 King, ​The Moldovans: Romania, Russia, and the Politics of Culture,​ 187-188.  
93 Ibid., 188.  
94 Ibid.,​ ​189.  
95 Irina F. Selivanova, ​US and Russian Policymaking with Respect to the Use of Force,​ Edited by Jeremy R. 
Azrael, Rand, 1996, 59.  
96 Kaufman, ​Modern Hatreds,​ 142.  
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Pridnestrovian Moldovan Republic, thus formally rejecting Moldovan legal authority east of 
the Dniester.   97
Though reneged by Chisinau, this decision ultimately proved decisive in precipitating 
the first round of armed confrontations that would ensue between Transistrian and 
Moldova-backed groups. The first of these broke out on 2 November 1990 in the west bank 
city of Dubossary, where Moldovan police attempting to liberate the town’s district council, 
courthouse, and attorney’s office which were being held by members of the predominantly 
Russophone population, opened fire on the crowds and killed three people.  These events 98
occurred the same day as clashes between Moldovan volunteer detachments and 
Transnistrian forces in the west bank city of Bendery, situated directly across the Dniester 
from Tiraspol.  Almost immediately, Transnistrian elites began using their control over the 99
local news media to invoke the “victims of Dubossory” and stoke anti-Moldovan sentiment 
amongst the Russophone population in the east bank, prompting mirrored responses from 
Chisinau and thus deepening the security dilemma.   100
Although the presence of Soviet Interior Ministry troops in Moldova was initially 
effective in preventing the outbreak of open hostilities, minor clashes between Moldovan and 
Transnistrian irregulars grew increasingly frequent over the course of 1990 and 1991. The 
failure of the August 1991 coup proved instrumental in disrupting this equilibrium. Given the 
Moldovan Communist party’s opposition to the coup alongside their weakness, the August 
putsch prompted parliament to declare Moldova an independent republic days later on 27 
August 1991, simultaneously seizing all Soviet and party assets on Moldovan territory.  101
97 King, ​The Moldovans: Romania, Russia, and the Politics of Culture, ​189.  
98 Selivanova, ​US and Russian Policymaking with Respect to the Use of Force,​ 61. Other sources cite a higher 
deal toll; for example, Kaufman’s account lists 6 casualties.  
99 Kaufman, ​The Moldovans: Romania, Russia, and the Politics of Culture,​ 144.  
100 Ibid., 149.  
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Chisinau also oversaw the abduction and extradition of Igor Smirnov from Kiev, using his 
support for the illegal coup attempt as justification. The Transnistrian leadership’s response 
was to blockade the rail lines to Moldova while threatening to cut off Moldova’s access to 
Transnistrian gas and electricity until Smirnov’s release.  Upon his eventual release, 102
Smirnov hurriedly organized a referendum on Transnistrian independence from Moldova.  
While the ultimate objective of “independence within the USSR” was impossible 
without the signing of a new all-Union treaty, key legislative actions had unfolded in 
Moscow which empowered the aims of secessionist groups throughout the union. In April 
1991 Politburo member Anatolii Lukyanov, an avid and vocal supporter of the Transnistrian 
cause as a base from which to prevent Moldova’s drift from Soviet influence, petitioned for 
the inclusion of a clause in the new Union treaty draft stating:  
 
“that in the event that any republic refuses to sign the Union Treaty, and autonomous 
republics and regions, as well as territories with compactly settled national groups 
express themselves against such a refusal, they then have the right to enter the USSR 
as independent subjects of the federation, with an appropriate status …”   103
 
Moreover, the pro-independence outcome of the referendum succeeded in confirming 
the popular mandate behind the Transnistrian authorities’ Russophone agenda and validated 
their attempts to secure their region’s autonomy by any means necessary against anticipated 
Moldovan incursions.  Riding the tide of the successful referendum and his subsequent 104
election to the presidency of the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic (PMR) in December 
102 King, ​The Moldovans: Romania, Russia, and the Politics of Culture, ​191 
103 Pavel Anokhin, “Istochnik voiny v Pridnestrov'e no iskat' v Moskve”, ​Moskovskii Komsomolets​, 
 5 April 1994, p. 2. 
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1991, Smirnov began his “creeping putsch” armed campaign to use the recently mobilized 
Dnester Guard forces to establish de facto control over the whole of Transnistria, targeting 
primarily cities and townships harboring pro-Moldovan police forces.  Dubossary proved 105
the site of yet another escalation in hostilities when Moldovan police attempted to disarm 
Transnistrian regulars that entered the city on 18 December 1991, constituting the first of in 
series of major armed confrontations in and around the west bank cities of Dubossary and 
Bendery that escalated through the spring and summer of 1992.  106
Early Russian Involvement: Conflict Management or Conflict Promotion? 
 Particularly given its weakness in the immediate post-Soviet period, Moscow 
remained initially ambivalent regarding the strategy it aimed to implement in regards to 
Transnistria. The dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991 merely served to deepen 
divisions within Moscow over the Transnistrian issue as bloodshed between Chisinau and 
Tiraspol intensified into 1992. Seeking to avoid the escalation of such bloody ethnic conflict 
as was already underway in Nagorno-Karabakh while also hoping to retain Russian influence 
in the region and protect the status of the Transnistrian Russophones who remained loyal to 
Moscow, authorities in the newly formed Russian Federation were split on how best to broker 
a peace settlement that would grant concessions to Moldova but not threaten the 
Transnistrians. In light of other more pressing issues, namely the establishment of joint CIS 
directives and the managed implementation of economic “shock therapy,” Yeltsin maintained 
almost complete silence on the conflict until early spring.  
Amidst official indecision in Moscow, the former Soviet Fourteenth Army, 
headquartered in Tiraspol, proved instrumental in driving Russian support for the breakaway 
republic from beneath, as their forces coordinated closely with Transnistrian efforts to 
105 Kaufman, ​The Moldovans: Romania, Russia, and the Politics of Culture,​ 151.  
106 King, ​The Moldovans: Romania, Russia, and the Politics of Culture, ​192.  
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mobilize and consolidate control over the east bank territories. Reported collaboration 
between the Fourteenth Army and Transnistria dates back to as early March 1991 but reached 
a critical point following the August Putsch and subsequent creation of a Transnistrian militia 
force the following September.  Alongside training and logistics support, the Fourteenth 107
Army also reportedly oversaw the transfer of as many as 20,000 firearms to the Transnistrian 
forces.  Collaboration between the two factions was so close that the notoriously corruptible 108
Commander of the Fourteenth Army Genadii Yakovlev was appointed Transnistrian Minister 
of Defence by Smirnov himself in December 1991.  109
Transnistrian forces were also abetted by incoming Cossack revivalists sponsored by 
pro-Cossack, Russian-based enterprises in Sochi and Rostov arriving with the intention of 
defending “Russia.”  These Cossacks,   alongside the mass defections from the Fourteenth 110 111
Army, were granted considerable moral support from voices within Russia, namely Russian 
Vice President Alexander Rutskoi and the Nationalist newspapers ​Den’ ​and ​Krasnaya 
Zvezda, ​the later of which began actively signalling its recognition of the Transnistrian 
“republic,” despite its illegality, as early as 1990.  This demonstration of clear favoritism for 112
the Transnistrian cause in Moscow, alongside Gorbachev’s prior weaponization of the 
107 King, ​The Moldovans: Romania, Russia, and the Politics of Culture, ​191.  
108 Chinn, ​Peacekeeping and the Role of Russia in Eurasia,​ ​108.  
109 Bennett, ​Condemned to Repetition, ​313.  
110 Kaufman, ​The Moldovans: Romania, Russia, and the Politics of Culture,​ 151.  
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members. Given the primarily ethnic Russian makeup of its membership, most Cossacks in the post-Soviet 
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national interests and revitalization of the Russian state. Their participation in the conflict in Moldova on the 
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Transnistria issue to coerce President Snegur into signing the new Union treaty throughout 
1990 and 1991, had poisoned relations between Moscow and Chisinau and rendered the 
secural of an equitable peace arrangement upon the flare in hostilities in early 1992 
considerably difficult for Yeltsin.  
Despite active and vocal support for the Transnistrian cause in Moscow, Russian 
Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev led the liberal internationalist attempt to genuinely 
reestablish Russia’s neutrality in a multilateral conflict mediation process. During a session 
of the OSCE in March 1992, Kozyrev proposed a settlement that would enlist the support of 
both Romania and Ukraine and provide Transnistria a legal path to independence in the event 
of Moldova’s merger with Romania.  On 1 April, Yeltsin sought to bolster this progress by 113
announcing the transferral of the Fourteenth Army to formal Russian jurisdiction. Hoping to 
quell the rapid flow of defectors and weapons to the Transnistrian militia, Yeltsin also sought 
to reestablish the Fourteenth Army as a neutral military presence capable of contributing a 
functional role to the process as a peacekeeping force. Though in light of the fact that nearly 
all the Fourteenth Army’s roughly 6,000 troops and the majority of its officers were 
permanent Transnistrian residents, their proposed use as a peacekeeping force was both 
politically unacceptable to Moldova and practically untenable given their intrinsically 
pro-Transnistrian bias.  114
The precariousness of the liberal internationalist minimal intervention platform was 
further compromised by Vice President Rutskoi, whose mounting opposition to Yeltsin’s and 
Kozyrev’s attempts to retain Russia’s neutrality in the conflict culminated in his unsanctioned 
April visit to Tiraspol. Mirroring positions forwarded by the anti-Yeltsin nationalist bloc in 
the Russian parliament, Rutskoi called for Moscow to recognize the sovereignty and 
113 Bennett, ​Condemned to Repetition,​ 313; ​Izvestiya, ​25 March 1992.  
114 Selivanova, ​US and Russian Policymaking with Respect to the Use of Force,​ 64.  
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independence of the PMR and established humanitarian justifications for Russian 
intervention which hinged on their responsibility to “defend Russians and other citizens,” 
referring to the Sovietized Russophones of the east bank.  Rutskoi’s stance was typical of 115
conservative nationalists in parliament and in the Russian armed forces, many of whom 
viewed the possibility of Romanian involvement in the conflict mediation process as a grave 
geopolitcal misstep that would compromise Russia’s traditionally dominant position in the 
“near abroad.”   116
In light of Yeltsin’s ambivalence on the course of action in March-April 1992, 
however, Moldova perceived Rutskoi’s line to represent the official policy of Russia on 
Transnistria. Thus, calls from Chisinau calling on Russia to cease its support for pro-PMR 
Cossack and Fourteenth Army military detachments grew increasingly frequent in May and 
June. Invoking the fact that international law rendered the deployment of the Fourteenth 
Army in Moldova an illegal occupation of sovereign territory by a foreign army, President 
Snegur demanded on 12 May that Yeltsin order the withdrawal of the Army from Moldova.  117
Similar calls further intensified following orders from the Fourteenth Army leadership to 
“answer fire with fire” on 19 May in response to increasing attacks on Russian army units by 
Moldovan artillery units.   118
Meanwhile, the nationalist-dominated Ministry of Defence firmly emphasized that 
retaliatory actions were taken only in response to attacks against Russian military 
installations or compounds, attempts to seize Russian weapons, or credible threats to army 
115 Chinn, ​Peacekeeping and the Role of Russia in Eurasia,​ 108-109.  
116 Lynch, ​Russian Peacekeeping Strategies in the CIS,​ 114; Furthermore, allegations had been forwarded by the 
Russian Defence Minister Alexander Grachev that Moldovan forces were being armed and coordinated actively 
by the Romanian military. While King’s account holds that certain Moldovans admitted that they received some 
military hardware from Moldova, it is likely that they received the majority of their arms from other Fourteenth 
Army stores located elsewhere in the Republic, see King, 192.  
117 Brian G. Taylor,​“Managing Conflict in the Former Soviet Union: Russian and American Perspectives,” 
edited by Alexei G. Arbatov and Abram Chayes, The MIT Press, 1997, 181.  
118 ​Izvestiya, ​20 May 1992.  
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personnel.  The MoD also expressed the official view that the Fourteenth Army maintained 119
its neutrality throughout the conflict and that any allegations holding that it had participated 
in aggressive actions against Moldova were entirely lacking in credibility.  The newly 120
inaugurated Minister of Defence, Pavel Grachev, however, expressly rejected the inclusion of 
Romania in the peace negotiations, echoing Rutskoi’s call for the protection of “the rights of 
Russian citizens and of persons who identify themselves with Russia ethnically and 
culturally.”  121
Russian Intervention and Subsequent “Peacekeeping” Efforts  
Though Yeltsin’s decision to nationalize the Fourteenth Army had done little to limit 
the flow of arms and personnel to the Transnistrian guard, he was simulataneoulsy aware that 
any attempt by Russia to reassert direct control over the Army’s stores might spark mutiny 
within its ranks and risk the wholesale defection of the Fourteenth Army to Transnistria. 
Nonetheless, Yeltsin formally ceded to pressure from Snegur and the liberal internationalists 
seeking to limit Russian entanglement in the conflict and to whom Yeltsin owed a large 
degree of his popular support in those early months, leading him to announce the withdrawal 
of the Fourteenth Army from Moldova in late May 1992.  Unfortunately, this announcement 122
was never officiated and merely served to intensify the struggle between both sides to gain 
access to the Army’s vast weapons stores.  
This decision also in part facilitated the rapid intensification of fighting that occured 
in June over the west bank city of Bendery. Though recently incorporated into the PMR via 
local referendum, Bendery was home to a sizeable pro-Moldovan police force that had 
frequently struggled with the pro-Tiraspol militia that presumed control over the township. 
119 Taylor, ​“Managing Conflict in the Former Soviet Union: Russian and American Perspectives,”​ 181.  
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Chisinau invoked a call from the city for the defense of this municipal police force from 
Transnistrian harassment as the pretext for their 19 June 1992 armed advance on Bendery 
aimed at the “restoration of the legal organs of power” in the city.  Following Chisinau’s 123
initial armed advance, PMR forces, with considerable personnel and artillery support from 
the Fourteenth Army, quickly retaliated and overpowered the ill-equipped Moldovan military, 
allowing the Dnester Guards to successfully retake the city by 21 June.   124
The Ministry of Defence conceded that the PMR defence of Bendery constituted the 
first active assault against Moldovan forces in the course of the conflict involving Fourteenth 
Army personnel.  It is difficult, however, to determine the degree to which Moscow ordered 125
this ultimate decision to intervene. Yeltsin had only days earlier expressed his commitment to 
using Russia’s influence to “stop the bloodshed” in Transnistria, but by summer 1992, 
communication between Moscow and the Fourteenth Army had largely broken down.  126
Furthermore, there is no accessible evidence of any advanced planning by either the Kremlin 
or MoD for the use of the Fourteenth Army in the conflict.  Therefore, many believe that the 127
Fourteenth Army acted unilaterally in its support of Transnistrian forces, though there is 
debate surrounding who can be realistically held accountable for the Army’s actions.  
Some have held that the Fourteenth Army’s commander, Lieutenant-General Iurii 
Netkachev, made the decision to intervene himself.  Such claims, however, ignore the fact 128
that Netkachev was widely unpopular in the army’s ranks and proved largely ineffectual 
during his short term in command.  Appointed with the express purpose of limiting 129
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Fourteenth Army engagements with Moldovan forces and stemming the flow of arms to the 
PMR militia, Netkachev gradually lost the confidence of his troops by hamfistedly seeking to 
fulfil the CIS directive ordering the Fourteenth Army to turn over its arms to the Moldovan 
government, an untenable demand given that the demobilization process following the fall of 
the Soviet Union had left the Army increasingly concentrated in Transnistria.  130
In fact, most sources point out that, on the eve of the crisis in Bendery, Netkachev had 
been functionally replaced as commander of the Fourteenth Army by former Afghan war 
hero, Russian General Alexander Lebed.  A Yeltsin supporter during the 1991 coup but a 131
close associate of Grachev’s by mid-1992, Lebed had been sent to Transnistria to assess the 
involvement of the Fourteenth Army and verify information regarding the theft and 
transferral of weapons. However, shortly following the outbreak of the crisis, Lebed assumed 
operational control of the Fourteenth Army and personally oversaw the defeat of Moldovan 
forces, as the majority of the scholarly literature will emphasize.  
As circumstantial evidence points out, however, there is a great deal of evidence to 
suggest that the Fourteenth’s Army’s counterattack was directly coordinated by the defence 
ministry. The Russian newspaper ​Rossiiskie Vesti ​in February 1994 wrote, “only now, 
summing up the facts have we come to understand: every step of the Army’s commander 
[Lebed] was authorized by the hierarchy of Russia’s Ministry of Defence,” confirming the 
prior admissions of State Council member Sergei Stankevich to similar effect.  The timing 132
of the attack also raises suspicions regarding the degree to which entire engagement may 
have been staged by the military. Less than a day before the initial Moldovan advance, 
Yeltsin had given a forceful speech to US congress highlighting Russia’s newborn friendship 
130 Taylor, ​“Managing Conflict in the Former Soviet Union: Russian and American Perspectives,”​ 182.  
131 Chinn, ​Peacekeeping and the Role of Russia in Eurasia, ​109.  




with the West and commitment to liberal norms and values, a moment which came to 
represent the high point of the liberal internationalist model.  Considering the course of 133
events on the ground and Yeltsin’s temporary absence from direct policy making given his 
being abroad, there remains a degree of likelihood that not only was the decision to intervene 
undertaken unilaterally by the MoD, or at least strategically executed by the Dnester Guards, 
that it was likely carried out with the express intention of deligitimating the government’s 
diplomatic and reformist platform.  
Intervention as Developing Domestic Consensus on the Use of Force 
Regardless of the degree of their preordainment, the events in Bendery had a series of 
important implications for the course of later developments. Firstly, the Russian government 
and public perceived the Fourteenth Army’s victory as a military and political success. 
Though the battle resulted in casualties approaching 500,  General Lebed’s decisive 134
leadership had demonstrated the vastly superior firepower of the Russia-backed PMR forces 
and had reestablished the “neutrality” of the Fourteenth Army by returning it to its barracks 
and preventing the further theft of its weaponry.  And while the loss of Bendery had 135
weakened Chisinau’s position to demand concessions from Tiraspol, ​Snegur saw Lebed as a 
legitimate mediating figure whose success in stemming the unrestricted flow of arms to 
Transnistrian forces considerably mitigated the security dilemma that had plagued the earlier 
stages of the conflict.  136
Perhaps most important were the implications that this victory had on the position of 
the liberal internationalists. A great deal of this has to do with the general absence of Western 
133  Jeffrey Checkel, “Structure, Institutions, and Process: Russia's Changing Foreign Policy,” 54.  
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factor of three. See: Selinova, 66; ​Rossiyskaya Gazeta ​29 June 1992; ​Nezavisimaya Gazeta​, 29 June 1992.  
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response to the actions of the Fourteenth Army and the degree to which it discredited the 
basis upon which most liberal internationalists opposed the use of force, namely that to defy 
the Western code of “good conduct” would jeopardize Russia’s attempts to integrate 
economically with the wealthy G-7 states.  This also notified the Russian elite establishment 137
of the degree of latitude they possessed in pursuing similar actions throughout the near 
abroad. As former foreign policy advisor to Yeltsin Andranik Migranyan notes, “the West 
feared that any strong response to Russia over the 14th Army's actions ... might overburden 
the ruling democrats, and therefore refrained from any serious demarches against Russia.”   138
Unfortunately, their inaction ultimately bore the opposite effect; despite their initial 
condemnation of Fourteenth Army actions, Yeltsin and Kozyrev were forced to fall in line 
with the events that unfolded on the ground and begin campaigning more forcefully for 
Russia’s responsibility in managing the conflict directly. In late June Yeltsin claimed that that 
Russia needed to demonstrate to Snegur that Russia has the “force” to “protect people and 
stop bloodshed” in Moldova, as Kozyrev responded to Moldova’s 8 July request for a CSCE 
peacekeeping operation by saying “this is, after all, our zone of responsibility, and it is we 
who should find the forces to play the disengagement role.”  Again, hesitance on the part of 139
the CSCE to involve itself in the peacekeeping process strengthened the resolve of 
nationalists in Moscow and ultimately forced Chisinau to the bargaining table. After being 
forced to sue for a Moscow-dominated peace, Snegur eventually agreed to talks with Russia, 
setting the groundwork for the Yeltsin-Snegur agreement of 21 July 1992. Alongside a 
separate statute declaring Transnistria’s “special status” in Moldova, the agreement officiated 
the eventual deployment of a joint Russian-Moldovan-Dnestr peacekeeping force on 29 July. 
137 ​Lynch, "The Realism of Russia's Foreign Policy," 14.  
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While liberals such as Kozyrev still opposed direct intervention, the events in 
Bendery and their international and domestic reception had consolidated consensus around 
Russia’s right to use of force as a peacekeeper in the near abroad. With time, peacekeeping 
became used increasingly as a tool to achieve exclusive Russian interests in the near abroad. 
The record in Moldova helps to support this case. For example, Moldova’s repeated requests 
for UN and CSCE participation in talks over the withdrawal of the Fourteenth Army were 
repeatedly forestalled by parliament until the reformation of the army’s units into the 
Operational Group of Russian Forces in Moldova, currently deployed in the northern 
Transnistrian town of Cobasna.  Moscow also repeatedly levied the threat of disbanding the 140
Fourteenth Army (with the implicit assumption being the ​de facto ​transferral of the force to 
Transnistrian control) and the imposition of a heavy tariff structure against Moldova as an 
initially non-CIS state in order to coerce Chisinau into reconsidering its anti-Moscow 
position. These combined pressures eventually bore fruit and by January 1993 public support 
in Chisinau for reunification with Romania had sharply deteriorated and in late October the 
Moldovan parliament voted to formally join the CIS economic union.   141
As shall be evident in later case studies, the gradual development of Russia’s 
approach to the conflict in Moldova highlights the increasing influence of the military as a 
leading actor in future interventions. The MFA’s initial pursuit of diplomacy as a form of 
conflict resolution was ultimately replaced by a more assertive and coercive military strategy 
aimed at securing long term Russian military presence in Moldova, excluding Romania from 
the peace process, and ensuring Moldova’s membership in the CIS. This chain of events also 
signals the beginning of the end for liberal influence over Russian foreign policy formulation. 
This development will be traced further in the following case study on the Georgia.  
140 Selivanova, ​"U.S. and Russian Policymaking With Respect to the Use of Force",​ 72.  
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Chapter V - Georgia: South Ossetia and Abkhazia 
Introduction 
A small and mountainous country nestled between the North and South Caucasus, 
Georgia emerged from the ashes of the Soviet Union eager to escape its colonial legacies yet 
remained stunted by its ethnic heterogeneity, economic underdevelopment, and contentious 
relationship with its paternalistic superpower neighbor, Russia. These weaknesses set the 
stage for the intense political instability, civil war, and partial territorial dismemberment that 
swiftly followed Georgia’s attainment of independence in April 1991. This section will 
primarily concern itself with outlining the two distinct yet interrelated conflicts that broke out 
in the regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia with particular emphasis on Russia’s role in 
their respective outcomes and their role as further test cases for the efficacy and palatability 
of Russian “peacekeeping” interventions.  
Though unique in their origins, both conflicts centrally involve the reactionary efforts 
of marginalized and localized ethnic groups historically native to the Georgian land seeking 
independence from the newly created Georgian state. Such efforts in both regions were met 
with militarized resistance from Georgia and resulted in a series of armed conflicts between 
1991 and 1994 - none of which have succeeded in officially settling the territorial disputes. 
Furthermore, despite being internationally recognized as territorial provinces within Georgia, 
the regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia have largely retained their de facto independence 
since 1993 and 1992, respectively.  
The case of Georgia remains pertinent to this study for a number of reasons. First, the 
flow of events in both conflicts, particularly South Ossetia, are noticeably synchronized with 
those in Moldova, reflecting the degree to which events that unfolded across the FSU and 
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their reception in Moscow were deeply interlocked at this time. The peacekeeping mission to 
South Ossetia also stands out as Russia’s first successful peacekeeping attempt and provides 
a crucial template upon which other future Russian-led peacekeeping efforts would be based. 
Moreover, the war in Abkhazia, particularly given its timing, proves crucial for mapping the 
gradual shift in Russian foreign policy goals away from Kozyrev’s internationalist agenda 
and towards a more coercive and nationalist approach. The deployment of a Russia-led CIS 
peacekeeping force in May 1994 represents the culmination of a gradually developing 
intervention strategy aimed at leveraging conflict resolution against the Georgian government 
in order to fulfill the key security interests of the Russian Federation, namely the 
establishment of exclusive Russian basing rights on Georgian territory, Georgia’s entrance 
into the CIS, the stabilization of the North Caucasus, and the prevention of potentially 
destabilizing foreign incursions.  
Antiquity into the Premodern Period 
Though the backdrop to these conflicts rests fundamentally in the development of 
ethnic frictions and their eventual explosion following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the 
development of these ethnic frictions stems equally from Soviet policy as it does from 
conflictual ethnocultural histories that characterize Georgia’s regional and demographic 
fissures. Historical records of Georgia as a discrete polity date back to the eleventh century, 
when the name ​Sakartvelo​, the Georgian word meaning “the place of the Georgians,” first 
appears. Georgian statehood, however, traces much further back into the pre-Christian period, 
beginning when Parnevazi, the first Georgian monarch, conquered Colchis, the ancient 
kingdom encompassing the majority of coastal western Georgia, including the current day 
municipal regions of Abkhazia, Guria, Imeretia, and Svaneti.   142
142 Shireen T. Hunter, ​The Transcaucasus in Transition: Nation Building and Conflict, ​Washington, D.C.: 
Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1994, 111.  
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The first pre-modern manifestation of Georgia as a unitary state followed in the 
eleventh century C.E. when an influential Abkhazian prince ruling over Colchis inherited the 
majority of the remaining Georgian lands to the east, creating the kingdom of Kartli.  This 143
period is often referred to as the “Golden age” of medieval Georgia, a zenith of Georgian 
cultural and political achievement that flourished for over two centuries, only to be thwarted 
by Mongol invasions beginning in the thirteenth century.  Though the eventual retreat of the 144
Mongols allowed Georgia to regain its independence, internal conflict beginning in the 
mid-fifteenth century rendered Georgia geographically divided across its east-west axis, 
leaving it subject to further fragmentation under foreign rule for much of its pre-modern 
history.  Indirect Safavid rule in Georgia’s eastern provinces and Ottoman control over the 145
western coastal lands began shortly thereafter and continued until the expansion of Russia 
into the Caucasus towards the end of the sixteenth century.  Though Russian rule in the 146
Caucasus was by no means quiescent, the revocation of Abkhazia’s autonomous status in 
1864 sparked a series of violent protests in Abkhazia suppressed by Russia with extreme 
force, sending thousands of Abkhazians into exile in Turkey.  147
When Georgia finally regained independence in 1918 amidst the violence and anarchy 
of the Russian revolution, Abkhazians, through the pro-Georgian and Menshevik Abkhaz 
People’s Council, began to press for autonomous regional status within a de facto union with 
Georgia.  Political and diplomatic differences, however, soon soured relations between 148
Georgia and the Abkhaz People’s Council and the two remained engaged in intermittent 
conflict until the Soviet invasion of Georgia in 1921.  Meanwhile, the South Ossetians 149
143 Kaufman, ​Modern Hatreds : The Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War,​ ​88.  
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conducted a series of Bolshevik-backed uprisings against Menshevik Georgian rule, leaving 
death tolls in the thousands and forcing nearly twenty thousand South Ossetians into North 
Ossetia to escape reprisal.  150
Georgia Under the Soviet Union 
Upon the incorporation of Georgia into the Soviet Union, special territorial 
arrangements were created for the Ossetians and Abkhaz. Ossetians received a homeland 
within Georgia in the form of the South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast. Although formally 
isolated from the North Ossetian Autonomous Oblast located in the Russian Socialist 
Federated Soviet Republic (RSFSR), Ossetians from both regions enjoyed considerable 
mobility and were largely able to remain cross-border links.  Furthermore, as a largely 151
mountainous region, South Ossetia was suitable for neither industry nor mass agricultural 
endeavors and thus was not subject to the demographic restructuring that many other ethnic 
homelands experienced under Stalin.  Therefore, the ethnic situation in South Ossetia 152
throughout much of the Soviet period proved relatively stable.  
The situation in Abkhazia proved far more complex. In contrast to South Ossetia, 
Abkhazia was initially granted status as an ethnic republic territorially and administratively 
separate from Georgia. Months later, however, Abkhazia signed away certain of its 
“sovereign” powers in a bilateral treaty with Georgia.  The treaty itself was largely 153
symbolic at the time, particularly given that both republics were subordinate to Moscow as 
well as party to the short-lived Transcaucasian Republic which then encompassed Georgia, 
Armenia, and Azerbaijan. In 1931, however, Abkhazia was formally stripped of its Union 
150 Kaufman, ​Modern Hatreds : The Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War,​ 88.  
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Republic status by Stalin, himself an ethnic Georgian, and was demoted to an Autonomous 
Republic within the Georgian SSR.   154
This betrayal, alongside Stalin’s draconian Russification and collectivization policies, 
devastated Georgia’s minority communities. The Abkhazian alphabet was “Georgianized,” 
native language schools were closed throughout Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and Stalin’s 
five-year-plans drew in large numbers of Russian and Mingrelian Georgian agricultural 
workers to work in Abkhazia, diluting the Abkhazian demographic presence.  Though 155
Stalin’s death signalled a mild reversal of the more repressive of these centralization policies, 
Georgian preeminence persisted and reinforced minority demands for increased political and 
cultural representation. The Abkhaz in particular were extremely vocal and staged over five 
separate sets of major public demonstrations over fifty years, the last of which explicitly 
demanded the transferral of Abkhazia to the Russian SSR.  Tbilisi responded in 1978 with a 156
series of concessions aimed at rebuilding the infrastructure-poor region while also agreeing to 
permit a greater degree of Abkhazian cultural expression through the creation of Abkhazian 
language television broadcasts and the founding of an Abkhaz State University.  By 1989, 157
however, the Abkhaz population of Abkhazia comprised only 17.8 percent of the population 
against 45.7 percent share of Georgians and a disproportionately large settlement of ethnic 
Russians.  Thus Abkhaz fears of gradual Georgianization and potential ethnic extinction 158
persisted despite these largely symbolic concessions, allowing ethnic tensions to ferment well 
into the 1980’s. 
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Glasnost and the Georgian Nationalist Movement 
These minority grievances were complicated by Georgians’ own troubled self image 
and sense of ethnic insecurity. Having been subjected to foreign incursions from the north, 
south and west for centuries, Georgian desires for cultural self-preservation have frequently 
inhibited their ability to sympathize with the grievances of their minority cohabitants. Thus, 
with increased mobilizational freedoms afforded by Glasnost, Georgian nationalist 
demonstrations arose in the mid 1980’s and, though initially preoccupied by environmental 
and subnational issues, eventually grew more radical and chauvinistic in their glorification of 
Georgian national pride and denunciation of continued Soviet rule, targeting specifically the 
growth and increased influence of minority groups.  Though the Georgian government 159
responded to certain demands of the growing number of extremist nationalist groups, the 
intensely anti-Soviet tenor of the Georgian primordialists  soon eclipsed the movement and 160
spawned considerable instability within the republic.  
It was amidst this political atmosphere that the Abkhaz separatists began their 
secessionist campaign. Beginning with a formal letter sent to the Nineteenth All-Union Party 
Conference in June 1988 and the formation of an Abkhazian Popular Forum in November, 
the forum’s representatives repeatedly called on Moscow to recognize Abkhazia as a full 
Union republic throughout the spring of 1989, eschewing the less provocative path of simply 
pursuing increased sovereignty.  The April protests of that year proved to be a watershed 161
moment for the Georgian nationalists, whose visceral and vocal opposition to Abkhaz 
independence soon morphed into explicitly anti-Soviet demonstrations which drew in a 
159 Kaufman, ​Modern Hatreds : The Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War​, 100.  
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Soviet military response, leading to the massacre of 19 Georgian citizens.  Far from 162
stabilizing the situation, the massacre instead reaffirmed Georgian fears of Moscow’s 
anti-Georgian agenda and intensified their opposition to the Abkhaz independence 
movement, which was increasingly seen as the primary internal threat to Georgia’s pursuit of 
independence. Especially potent were fears that Moscow might weaponize the plight of the 
Abkhazians and South Ossetians in order to sabotage the Georgian secessionist movement, 
fears that soon proved to be rooted more in reality than in paranoia.  
Gamsakhurdia and the Conflict in South Ossetia  
As irredentist fervor grew in both republics, several major events occured on the eve 
of and throughout 1990 which secured Georgia’s path to independence. The first of these 
regards the Georgian parliament’s move to annul the 1921-1922 agreement authorizing 
Soviet control over Georgia.  Though this did not mark Georgia’s official departure from 163
the Soviet Union, it constituted a major victory for Georgian opposition forces in that it 
secured their long term goal of electoral reform, authorized by the Georgian Supreme Soviet 
in August 1990, and set the terms for open parliamentary elections to be held the following 
October. The results of these elections signalled the departure of Georgia’s communist 
leadership from power and marked an overwhelming victory for the Round Table for 
National Liberation, a hardline Georgian nationalist party whose leader, Zviad 
Gamsakhurdia, a known Soviet dissident and Georgian hyper-nationalist, was appointed 
speaker of parliament. Among the primary goals of the newly empowered government was to 
pursue a series of nationalistic legislative efforts centered around the institutionalization of 
162 Kaufman, ​Modern Hatreds : The Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War​, 102 
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the Georgian language and redefinition of citizenship along explicitly ethnic Georgian lines.
  164
Gamsakhurdia also moved swiftly to reassert control over the restive regions of 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia. He responded swiftly to the South Ossetian Popular Front’s 
declaration of secession from the Georgian SSR on 10 November 1989 by reducing the 
SOAO to a common Georgian administrative unit and reverting the name back to the former 
feudal Georgian regionym of Samachablo.  Following parliament's ruling, skirmishes broke 165
out in the region’s capital of Tskhinvali after a group of roughly 30,000 Georgian nationalists 
- alongside several illegal armed formations - marched on the city in counterprotest to 
Ossetian picketers.  In the bloodshed that lasted intermittently from November 1989 to 166
January 1990, six people died and over five hundred were wounded.  The Georgian 167
government quickly moved to declare a state of emergency in the region and initiated a 
blockade on the shared border. South Ossetia’s response was to appeal to Moscow for aid. 
Given Gorbachev’s position of noninterference, based on fears that active involvement would 
hasten Georgia’s drift from Moscow and inspire other national independence movements 
across the union, the South Ossetians were left to rely on little but aid from North Ossetia, 
providing the only source of food and fuel for the region following Tbilisi’s blockade.  
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In January 1991, Gamsakhurdia ordered a detachment of 3,000 Georgian Interior 
Ministry troops supported by Georgian nationalist irregulars with the intention of suppressing 
the Ossetian independence movement once and for all. What followed was a bloody battle for 
Tskhinvali between Georgian militia troops and Ossetian self-defense groups that was 
followed by a renewed blockade of South Ossetia that deprived the region of water and 
electricity and halted industrial production for months on end.  Within two months, 53 168
Ossetians had died and over 230 were injured and 20,000 more displaced to Georgia and 
North Ossetia.  
Given the already deeply disruptive effect of Gamsakhurdia’s nationalizing policies 
and his increasingly aggressive stance against regional successionism, the leaders of both 
South Ossetia and Abkhazia persisted in their appeals to the Soviet center to avoid further 
Georgianization. Thus, when the USSR held a Union-wide referendum on the preservation of 
the Union on 17 March 1991 and the Georgian parliament prohibited its citizens from 
participating, the authorities in Tskhinvali carried on with the decision to hold the 
referendum. As could have been predicted, the results bore overwhelmingly in favor of the 
decision to preserve the Union and remain within the USSR.   169
As then-chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR, Yeltsin saw South Ossetia’s 
pro-Union stance as signalling its potentially treacherous pro-communist position, leading 
him to initially support Gamsakhurdia as a potential ally against Gorbachev.  The result of 170
talks on 24 March 1991 between Yeltsin and Gamsakhurdia was a resolution wherein the 
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RSFSR recognized the abolition of the South Ossetian Autonomous Region, thus tacitly 
granting Gamsakhurdia Russian approval in moving forward with his advance on Tskhinvali. 
Within less than a week of Gamsakhurdia ordering reinforcements to the South Ossetian 
capital, Georgian parliament passed a law abolishing the Tskhinvali and Znaur districts of 
South Ossetia in order to further undermine South Ossetia’s territoriality and restore Georgia 
as “a unitary state with no internal boundaries.”   171
The response in South Ossetia was calamitous. Border clashes grew into full scale 
military operations featuring the use of automatic weapons and heavy artillery and Tskhinvali 
was quickly surrounded by Georgian paramilitary forces nearing 12,000 in number.  The 172
only factor preventing a full scale Georgian invasion of the city was the presence of a small 
dispatch of Soviet Interior Ministry troops stationed in the city to maintain order.  At this 173
point, the Russian Congress of People’s Deputies (the precursor to the Supreme Soviet of the 
Russian Federation) chose to act against Yeltsin's move by passing a resolution which called 
for Georgia to restore South Ossetia to the status of an autonomous republic, lift the 
blockade, and resettle displaced refugees to their homes, threatening potential Soviet 
intervention if terms were rejected.   174
Though this resolution served to temporarily limit bloodshed throughout the majority 
of the summer, the course of events was wildly altered by the events following the failed 
August 1991 coup in Moscow. In the immediate aftermath of the putsch, the Georgian 
Prosecutor General issued a warrant for the arrest of several leading members of the South 
Ossetian government accused of “stirring up conflict between the Georgian and Ossetian 
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peoples,” as well as providing aid to the coup plotters.  While these claims remained largely 175
unsubstantiated, they ultimately did not result in the extradition of the accused from 
Tskhinvali, a fact at least partially explained by Gamsakhurdia’s increasingly tenuous grip on 
political control.  
The Georgian Civil War and the Fall of the Soviet Union 
Particularly following the May 1991 presidential elections, Gamsakhurdia’s 
hyper-nationalistic brand of authoritarianism grew to be increasingly conspicuous. His 
intolerance of political opposition, alongside allegations of treachery and deception in the 
days surrounding the failed August putsch in Moscow, fueled widespread opposition against 
Gamsakhurdia both domestically and internationally.  By mid-September, irregular militia 176
forces, including a large portion of the Georgian National Guard in tandem with the 
notoriously brutal paramilitary force known as the ​Mkhedrioni​, began to rally behind Prime 
Minister Tengiz Sigua and by late December, began active and armed opposition to 
Gamsakhurdia’s regime.  The eventual collapse of the Soviet Union on 21 December 1991, 177
thus effectively fell on deaf ears in Georgia as representatives from the remaining fourteen of 
the fifteen Soviet Republics met in Almaty, Kazakhstan to officiate the terms of the 
post-Union order. Georgia, per Gamsakhurdia’s command, was the only Republic not party 
to this meeting.  
This refusal to attend alongside Gamsakhurdia’s general uncooperativeness posed a 
perceivable threat to Yeltsin’s greater vision of a post-Union order which he hoped the 
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proposed CIS might establish.  Gamsakhurdia had also garnered a reputation as a 178
Russophobe and frequently entertained the idea of constructing a “Common Caucasian 
Home,” signalling a desire to create a unified regional alliance that might compromise 
Russia’s ​de facto​ influence in the region.  Nevertheless, from a surface level account, 179
Gamsakhurdia’s eventual removal from office was through domestic political means. On 21 
December the day after the Almaty summit, the National Guard and ​Mkhedrioni​ demanded 
Gamsakhurdia’s unconditional resignation. His refusal prompted the oppositionary forces to 
begin firing on Parliament and the presidential apparatus building until Gamsakhurdia’s 
eventual departure from Georgia on 6 January 1992, beginning his years in exile, first in 
Azerbaijan, then Armenia, and ultimately Chechnya as a guest of General Djohar Dudayev.   180
According to sources within Mkhedrioni, however, Russia’s role in financing and 
supporting the anti-Gamsakhurdia coalition was considerable. The coalition between 
segments of the National Guard and the outlawed Mkhedrioni militia had in fact been 
brokered by former leaders from Georgia’s exiled communist establishment with 
communication and patronage chains to the Kremlin.  Through these networks, Moscow 181
actively supported the oppositionary coalition with financial support and technical assistance 
in the form of military equipment and logistics training. Former chief of ​Mkhedrioni,​ Jaba 
Ioseliani, personally recounts the close relations between National Guard leader Tengiz 
Kitovani and Russian generals in Georgia at the time.  182
Complicating the situation was the South Ossetian leadership’s decision to continue 
its campaign to win the support of the Congress of People’s Deputies of the Russian 
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Federation. On 19 January 1992, the South Ossetians held a referendum on public support for 
both independence and whether or not to reunite with the Russia, the latter of which elicited a 
positive response from a resounding 98.2 percent of respondents.  Yeltsin remained initially 183
silent on the matter, as South Ossetia’s demonstration of allegiance to Russia called into 
question his prior belief in their potential treachery. The Russian parliament, however, 
headed by nationalist Ruslan Khasbulatov, demonstrated strong support for the South 
Ossetian cause, at least partially as a tactic to undermine the authority of the president.   184
Eduard Shevardnadze and the South Ossetian Litmus Test for Russian “Peacekeeping”  
Having successfully ousted Gamsakhurdia and established the provisional Military 
Council, its leaders Sigua, Kitovani, and Ioseliani faced the pressure of confirming the 
legitimacy of their putschist regime. Though the international community had already 
recognized Georgia’s independence, the Russian military continued to assume the role of 
guarantor of continued peace and stability, particularly given the Military Council’s extreme 
repression of the Zviadist militants concentrated in Gamsakhurdia’s former homeland of 
Mingrelia.  The coalition thus sought a charismatic and legitimate figure to lead newly 185
independent Georgia. They settled on former Secretary of the Georgian Communist Party and  
Recently dismissed Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, Eduard Shevardnadze. 
Despite his impressive credentials and considerable ruling experience, Shevardnadze 
enjoyed limited support from the Georgian populace, many of whom remained dubious of his 
conspicuous ties to the Kremlin.  Nonetheless, upon his return to Georgia in March 1992, 186
Shevardnadze acceded to the presidency of the so-called State Council, the hastily 
constructed heir to the disbanded Military Council, and entered office with the stated goal of 
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“national reconciliation.”  Although made in obvious reference to the continued action of 187
Zviadist conspirators throughout the country, this announcement also tacitly insinuated the 
reincorporation of both Abkhazia and South Ossetia into Georgia proper. For no matter the 
degree of Russian support and direction he received, Shevardnadze remained committed to 
preserving Georgian territorial integrity.  
This proved a difficult task for a number of reasons, most of which stemmed from his 
limited domestic support, rivalries within the State Council, and the worsening situation in 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia.  More crippling, however, was the deep hatred for 188
Shevardnadze held by many within the Russian Military and in parliament, many of whom 
credited Shevardnadze, former Soviet Foreign Minister under Gorbachev and a strong 
proponent of “new thinking,” as having been as chief among the actors that helped 
orchestrate the fall of the Soviet Union.  This contributed to the strained relationship that 189
would soon come to marr bilateral relations between the Georgian and Russian leadership. 
The first major test for this relationship would arise from residual tensions that 
remained between Tskhinvali and Tbilisi since the partial settlement of May 1991. Although 
delegations from South Ossetia, Georgia and the North Ossetian SSR had met on 13 May 
1992 to discuss a permanent settlement, large scale hostilities broke out again outside of the 
South Ossetian capital on 8 June between detachments of the Ossetian Guards and Georgian 
paramilitary units.  It was not until 20 June 1992, however, less than a day after the 190
Moldovan assault on Bendery, that the Shevardnadze regime initiated its full scale assault on 
Tskhinvali which effectively succeeded in destroying the city. While they were unable to 
seize the city, Georgian forces shelled and mortared the city throughout the assault, burning 
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down or destroying nearly 80 percent of the dwellings and administrative buildings in the 
city.  Furthermore, the flow of refugees from South Ossetia also exacerbated the situation in 191
North Ossetia, where tensions between Ingush and Ossetians had been mounting and 
threatened to further destabilize the already deeply fractured north Caucausus.  192
Though Shevardnadze initially denying official Georgian involvement in the siege of 
the city, citing the uncontrollable actions of “detachments out of the control of the Georgian 
government, the Russian Government later that day issued a statement accusing Georgia of 
staging a “military action designed to drive the non-Georgian population out of South 
Ossetia.”  This Russian response, though driven primarily by fears for the potentially 193
disastrous effect of further refugee flows on the stability of the region (particularly given the 
worsening situation in Chechnya), was also underscored by intense sympathies for the South 
Ossetians by nationalists in Moscow. Rutskoi labeled the Georgian invasion a genocide 
against the Ossetian people “conducted not by groups out of the control of the Georgian State 
Council, but by detachments of the national guard.”  194
Shevardnadze’s recalcitrance was short lived however, likely tempered by the 
unexpectedly swift and aggressive Russian actions in Moldova over the course of 19-22 June, 
and he was quickly forced to admit that the Georgian National Guard had indeed led the 
charge. He also agreed on 24 June 1992 to meet with Yeltsin and representatives of North 
and South Ossetia in Sochi to sign a cease-fire and discuss a settlement to the conflict, 
leading to the ratification on the issuance of peacekeeping forces in South Ossetia on 3 July.
 The agreement stipulated that the Georgian forces in the region would retreat and permit 195
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the deployment of a joint Russian, North Ossetian, South Ossetian, and Georgian armed force 
totalling at roughing 2,000 troops.  The participation of North Ossetians also allowed for an 196
effectively Moscow dominated force that has since been able to enforce South Ossetia’s ​de 
facto​ independence. Russia’s commitment to this end has persisted, most notably following 
the events of the 2008 Russo-Georgian war, wherein Russia intervened to protect Tskhinvali 
from a Georgian attempt to reintegrate the region by military force.  
Particularly given that it was in no way coordinated within the CIS, this peacekeeping 
mission was the first of its kind and served as a template for future Russian-led missions in 
Moldova, Abkhazia, Tajikistan and Azerbaijan (though Baku’s veto would ultimately prevent 
the deployment of peacekeepers). Its relative success has also reasonably justified continued 
Russian troop presence on Georgian soil, and reaffirmed, particularly in the eyes of the 
Russian military leadership, the indispensability of Russia as a mediating force in the FSU. In 
the words of Deputy Defence Minister, Colonel General Georgi Kondratev, the primary 
military authority over Russian peacekeeping forces, the success of the Sochi agreement has 
demonstrated that Russia alone possesses the capability and will to separate warring factions 
and induce a negotiated settlement.  As he claims, “peacekeeping in Russia has become an 197
issue of government policy, and peacekeeping issues are now part of our national military 
doctrine,” a position that would increasingly grow to define Russia’s policy in the near 
abroad, particularly as hostilities in Abkhazia began to intensify.  198
The War in Abkhazia 
Whereas the conflict in South Ossetia was waged and resolved swiftly and relatively 
bloodlessly, the war in Abkhazia was far more complex and gruesome, involving a much 
196 Gordadze, ​The Guns of August 2008: Russia's War in Georgia​,​ 31.  
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larger scope of violence and drawing in a motley assortment of combatants from around the 
region. The conflict spiral began amidst the chaos of early 1992, when the Abkhazian 
Supreme Soviet seized upon the apparent weakness in Tbilisi (and strength in Moscow) by 
voting on July 23 to restore the Abkhaz Constitution of 1925 under which Abkhazia retained 
its Union republic status and was not under Georgian administrative control.  This decision 199
was made in partial response to the State Council’s decision to reinstate Georiga’s pre-Soviet 
constitution of 1921, which did not stipulate the status of Abkhazia’s independence, therefore 
provided no pretext for Abkhazian autonomy.  The Georgian response, of course, was to 200
annul the decision, though Shevardnadze was hesitant to act upon the more sanguine 
demands from the more conservative and pro-nationalist factions of Georgian civil society. 
Domestic pressure from pro-nationalist factions continued to mount, however, particularly in 
opposition to Shevardnadze’s decision to allow Russian peacekeepers into South Ossetia.  
Meanwhile, Zviadist militant groups dispersed throughout and around 
Gamsakhurdia’s home region of Mingrelia continued to engage Georgian National Guard 
forces. Georgian forces had quickly suppressed the attempted Zviadist uprising in March 
1992 but this merely spawned a series of guerrilla actions and kidnappings throughout the 
summer of 1992.  On 11 August, after a declaration of amnesty for former Gamsakhurdia 201
supporters by Shevardnadze, Zviadist groups responded promptly with a second round of 
hostage-taking, among whom included Georgian Deputy Prime Minister Aleksandr 
Kavsadze. In response, on 14 August, Shevardnadze dispatched Defense Minister Tengiz 
Kitovani into the Mingrelian-inhabited region of eastern Abkhazia with a contingent of 
199 Dale, ​Peacekeeping and the Role of Russia in Eurasia​, 122. It should also be noted that this declaration 
occurred less than two days after the Yeltsin-Snegur agreement, likely signifying that Abkhazia anticipated a 
similar degree of Russian support in their struggle for independence.  
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Georgian National Guard troops to find the kidnappers and retrieve Kavsadze.  By as soon 202
as 18 August, Georgian troops had invaded Sukhumi and sacked the Abkhazian parliament 
building, sending Abkhazian members fleeing to Gudauta providing Kitovani with the 
resources necessary to establish a pro-Georgian council in the Abkhazian capital .  203
The events that followed and the official Georgian account of its actions in Abkhazia 
have since been held up to considerable scrutiny. The first issue concerns Georgian 
justifications for intervention and assault on Sukhumi. The primary impetus for intervention 
concerned the kidnapping of Kavsadze, whom Shevardnadze and Kitovani hoped to repatriate 
to Georgia, by force if necessary. A secondary dilemma was compounded by the issue of the 
recently downed Inguri river railroad bridge, the only operational rail line connecting Georgia 
and Russia, the destruction of which was linked to Zviadist forces operating in Abkhazia.  204
Though the Georgian military underlined the strategic need to defend and monitor the rail 
station alongside the retrieval of Kavsadze and other hostages as primary justifications for 
their intervention, circumstantial evidence reveals both to be dubious claims.  
Upon their entrance into Abkhazia, the bulk of Georgian troops spent little time 
searching for hostages and instead continued further West, arresting the mayor of 
Ochamchira and skirmishing with Abkhazian troops as they marched towards Sukhumi.  205
Furthermore, given the scale of armaments donned by the Georgian military and their limited 
cooperation and open conflagrations with Abkhaz troops, atop the fact that no evidence 
pointed to the presence of hostages west of Sukhumi, Kitovani’s assault more closely 
resembles a concerted Georgian effort to quickly and decisively assert military control over 
the breakaway region.  
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Shevardnadze, likely recognizing the volatility of the situation, made rapid efforts to 
avoid blame for the ultimately failed invasion, claiming that Kitovani had acted 
autonomously and against orders by attacking Sukhumi.  The extent to which the Georgian 206
government supported Kitovani, however, is also contentious, particularly given demands by 
Prime Minister Tengiz Sigua for an immediate ceasefire and withdrawal of troops upon 
learning of Kitovani’s attack on Sukhumi.  Regardless of Tblisi’s complicity in the decision 207
to divert attention to the siege on Sukhumi, Shevardnadze nonetheless supported the outcome 
of the invasion, saying “we have done the right thing,” and framing the immediate declaration 
of war by the Abkhaz as a provocation over which he could justify a war of “national 
defence.”   The war that followed would bear serious consequences for the future stability 208
of Georgia for years to come. 
Early Sources of Russian Intervention 
The war’s outbreak would also offer revanchists in Russia a key window of 
opportunity to test the limits of the liberal internationalist resolve in Moscow. As mentioned 
prior, Russia's early foreign policy making apparatus had undergone rapid institutional 
decentralization, breeding a great deal of confusion, contradiction, and competition where the 
actual implementation of policy was concerned. Thus, the official Russian position towards 
the Abkhaz conflict and the Transcaucasus region in general during much of 1992 was 
similarly disorganized and contradictory. Again, much of this stems from the fact that early 
1992 represented the height of power for the liberal internationalist factions in parliament, 
with whom Yeltsin himself was initially aligned.   209
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As such, Yeltsin initially strove to set a cautionary and neutral tone from the early 
days of the conflict, warning the peoples of the North Caucasus against seeking to destabilize 
the situation while also personally pledging to take diplomatic steps to resolve the conflict.  210
He also issued troops to secure the border with Russia and was successful initially in 
brokering a nominal ceasefire at a joint Georgian-Abkhaz conference in Moscow in early 
September 1992 aimed at the “restoration of security in the region.”  Perhaps most 211
crucially, he strongly emphasized the need to preserve the inviolability of post-Soviet 
borders, standing in stark contrast to his communist and nationalist opponents in parliament 
who cited Abkhazia’s strong pro-Russian orientation as cause for incorporating the territory 
into the Russian Federation.   212
Though this was never a reasonably viable strategy, such sentiments were shared by 
many of these nationalists who occupied key leadership positions in the Supreme Soviet and  
offered active and vocal support for the Abkhazian separatist movement, which they saw as 
an exploitable lever that Russia might use to pressure Georgia into accepting CIS 
membership and accept Russia’s permanent military presence in Georgia.  The Civic Union, 213
a leading and ostensibly moderate coalition of deputies in parliament, levied criticisms at the 
president for his “unjustified passivity” and refusal to defend the minority rights of the 
Abkhaz.  Sergei Baburin, leader of the conservative Russian All-Peoples-Union, went even 214
further stating that upon visiting the conflict zone he was unsure that Abkhazia was even part 
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of Georgia.  Though their efforts initially conflicted with those pursued by Yeltsin and the 215
Foreign Ministry, these nationalists helped stir interventionist momentum that would 
indirectly affect events on the ground in Abkhazia and, particularly given support from 
elements of the Russian military, proved successful in both deligitmating the liberal pacifist 
strategy and shaping Russia’s approach to the conflict.  
The first major move undertaken by the Supreme Soviet was their adoption of a series 
of resolutions on 25 September 1992 condemning Georgian actions in Abkhazia and 
demanding for the full withdrawal of Georgian troops and the subsequent deployment of a 
Russian peace-keeping force.  The resolutions also called for Yeltsin to broker a new set of 216
negotiations, thus tacitly rejecting the 3 September tripartite agreement. Roughly a week 
later, on 2 October 1992, Abkhaz forces supported by volunteers from the Confederation of 
Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus  staged an attack on the Georgian held Abkhaz town of 217
Gagri. This elicited a calamitous response from Tbilisi as Shevardnadze cast the events in 
Gagri as “the result of a vast plot against Georgia,” portraying the Supreme Soviet’s 
resolution as having empowered and encouraged the Abkhaz assault on Georgian troops.  218
Instances such as this would come to define the course of the conflict, particularly as Russian 
support for Abkhazia grew more pronounced in 1993, when remarkable Abkhaz victories 
grew to closely follow demonstrations of tacit support from conservatives in Moscow.  
The Bureaucratic Struggle for Power 
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Though the September ceasefire demonstrated a seemingly sincere effort on Yeltsin’s 
part towards localizing the conflict, its apparent inability to influence the events unfolding in 
Abkhazia fueled Yeltsin’s retreat from the issue, symbolizing his fading commitment to the 
prescriptions of liberal internationalism. In his absence, deliberation over Russian policy in 
Abkhazia at the executive level grew into a power struggle between The Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (MFA) and the Ministry of Defence (MoD). Though both ministries possessed deeply 
differing positions on the current administration in Georgia and the method of securing 
Russian interests in the region, they agreed on a handful of “first principles” regarding 
Russia’s diplomatic approach. These included the refusal to restore bilateral relations with 
Georgia until the resolution of the Abkhazia war as well as a commitment to a Russia 
dominated conflict resolution process free from external manipulation by international 
organizations.  Both also agreed on the need to maintain Georgian territorial integrity to 219
prevent a wave of secessionist movements across the already unstable North Caucasus.  220
The ministries differed, however, in their opinions on how best to apply these 
principles to the broader pursuit of a lasting settlement. To begin with, the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs was staffed by a handful of bureaucrats whom Shevardnadze had himself 
promoted when he served as minister, chief of which included Kozyrev himself.  Owing to 221
this as well as other more pragmatic factors, the MFA took a more conciliatory approach 
concerning relations with Shevardnadze, whom they saw as crucial for the perpetuation of a 
stable and friendly Georgia.  Therefore, the MFA had initially sought to normalize relations 222
between Russia and Georgia and coordinated with the MoD in the early months of 1992 to 
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officiate transferalls of military equipment from Russian to Georgian troops that began in 
June and continued into August.  223
Upon the outbreak of hostilities, Kozyrev strove, as he had in Moldova, to pursue a 
peaceful resolution to the conflict. In August 1992 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs released a 
report on the near abroad which, though it advocated for a leading Russian role in the region, 
still rejected the use of force as a tool of policy. The effects of the MFA failure in 224
managing Russian interests in Transnistria, however, grew increasingly evident through 
Kozyrev’s general absence from the key decision making process in Abkhazia until roughly 
spring of 1993. By that time, Kozyrev’s perspectives on multilateralism had already 
undergone a sea change. Although the MFA did express interest in cooperating with the UN, 
likely to secure financial support for the costly task of peacekeeping, Kozyrev also reportedly 
told the Under Secretary General for Political Affairs, Marrack Goulding, that the Russian 
government had considerable reservations regarding a UN peace conference and that it would 
ideally seek a regional peacekeeping effort in line with the September 1992 Moscow 
agreement.  225
The waning influence of the MFA allowed the military to assume a more prominent 
role in determining the thrust of Russian policy in the region. As the war’s events will attest, 
Yeltsin granted the military an increasingly significant degree of latitude in shaping security 
policy, particularly towards the end of 1992 and beginning of 1993 as Yeltsin’s liberal 
technocrat allies drew criticism for their failing policies agendas. Issues surrounding the illicit 
nationalisation of Soviet military equipment had been a long standing point of contention 
between Russia and Georgia, as it had been throughout the conflict ridden Caucasus. 
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Although Defence Minister Pavel Grachev had initially agreed to the peaceful transferal of 
military equipment from Georgia beginning in May 1992 and had linked this issue with 
Georgia's entrance into the CIS, the outbreak of fighting following the invasion of Abkhazia 
was followed by a wholesale halt in military transfers that continued until late 1993.  226
The ideational elements of the MoD’s approach revolved around the desire to 
maintain a strategic Russian troop presence in Georgia. At the time of the war’s outbreak, 
Russia had five active Russian military bases in Georgia at the time. The largest of these was 
located in in the coastal Abkhaz city of Gudauta, where the Abkhazian government-in-exile, 
led by former Communist boss Vladislav Ardzinba, had fled following the fall of Sukhumi.  227
Stressing the strategic value of these military positions, Grachev in a 23 February visit to 
Gudauta openly stated the Russian military’s strategic intention to remain in Abkhazia so as 
not to “lose the exit to the Black Sea.”  This demonstration of naked ambition was received 228
warmly by nationalists and key figures within the Russian military establishment, many of 
whom were deeply opposed to Yeltsin’s approach, arguing that the Russian military had the 
will and means to defend Abkhazia if granted the right to do so.  229
Covert Intervention Strategies  
Interventionist arguments were strengthened through 1992 and early 1993 as bilateral 
relations between Georgia and Russia steadily deteriorated. Threats to Russian military 
deployments began to emerge as early as 16 August when a Russian airborne division was 
issued to the base at Gudauta for assistance in evacuating stranded Russian vacationers from 
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the conflict zone and drew fire from Georgian military formations.  The series of more 230
direct attacks on Russian troops that followed soon after, however, proved instrumental 
towards mobilizing Russian military and government officials to demand a more assertive 
stance from Moscow on the conflict. On 14 December 1992, a surface-to-air missile fired 
from Georgian occupied territory shot down a Russian military helicopter airlifting refugees 
from the conflict zone, killing all aboard - mostly women and children.  This was followed 231
soon after by the 18 January downing of a Russian Mi-8 helicopter and a subsequent raid by 
Georgian irregular units on the Russian Fourth Supply Base in Tbilisi.   232
These factors, alongside encouragement from the Supreme Soviet and the Defence 
Ministry hierarchy, allowed the Russian military and its supporters in Moscow to further 
justify a position of increasingly direct support for Abkhazian forces. In spite of Yeltsin’s 
liberal platitudes emphasizing Russia’s regard for Georgian territorial integrity, a closer 
examination of the events on the ground in Abkhazia crucially supports the notion that, even 
before these events, agents within the Russian ground forces and military lobbies were 
already engaged in both moral and material support of Abkhazian forces throughout the 
course of their engagements with the Georgian military.  
Although evidence for direct military support was not immediately forthcoming, the 
series of impressive Abkhazian military victories against the purportedly better equipped 
Georgian forces that occurred throughout late 1992 and into 1993 heightened speculation 
regarding the possibility of covert Russian support. Various eyewitness accounts report the 
presence of Russian military equipment and active dutymen fighting amongst the ranks of 
Abkhazian forces. While evidence is limited in large part to personal testimonies, a handful 
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of cases point almost undeniably to Russia’s decidedly impartial role. Even Kozyrev himself 
admitted in November 1993 that “the Abkhaz demanded military aid,” though he refused to 
comment on whether or not the Russian military ever rendered such aid.  233
 Georgian accounts of Russian air support for Abkhazian troops against Georgian 
positions were ultimately corroborated after the downing of a Russian SU-27 on 19 March 
1993 over Sukhumi.  The Russian newspaper ​Izvestia ​reports that its pilot was Russian 234
Major Vatslav Shipko and lists it as one among a number of Russian aircraft shot down in 
Georgia, flying in the face of claims by Russian Defence Minister Pavel Grachev that such 
planes were piloted by Georgians bombing their own troops to ferment an anti-Russian 
disinformation campaign.  Other personal testimonies support these claims, such as those 235
from Mikhail Demianov, a businessman from St. Petersburg taken prisoner by the Georgians 
who detailed his involvement in selling arms to the Abkhaz through illicit channels and 
confirmed the presence of active Russian armed support of Abkhazian units.  Reports of 236
support for Abkhazian separatists also coincided with a sudden halt of military transfers from 
Russia to Georgia officiated by the Russian Ministry of Defence beginning in August 1992, 
following the outbreak of violence in the region.  237
While sources detailing the active participation of conscripted Russian soldiers remain 
subject to scrutiny, irrefutable evidence stands linking the participation of potential Russian 
proxies the conflict zone. From the early days of the conflict the Abkhaz received support 
from a variety of sources, including fighters from the Confederation of Mountain Peoples, 
Chechen militants, as well as members of the Grand United Circle of Cossacks, many of 
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whom were themselves Russian citizens, although likely operating without direct orders from 
Moscow.  Although Yeltsin had personally warned freelance fighters and rogue troops in 238
the region from participating in the conflict, Russia made no significant steps to quell the 
flow of fighters from Russian territory into Abkhazia.   239
This directly contradicts Yeltsin’s stated commitment to preserving Georgian 
territorial integrity in his “Appeal From the President to the Leadership of Georgia and 
Abkhazia,” wherein he promised that Russia would do all within its power to prevent the 
spread of arms and fighters from Russia into Abkhazia.  It should be noted, however, that 240
the dissonance between Yeltsin’s rhetoric regarding Russia’s role and the events on the 
ground speaks less to Yeltsin’s hidden or deceptive motives than it does to his tenuous 
control over Russian ground troops and the increasingly independent will of the Russian 
military.  
Spring 1993 and the Formulation of a Foreign Policy Consensus 
Regardless of the degree of initial coordination, by early 1993, the Russian 
government appeared to have developed a workable ​modus operandi​ for Abkhazia and for its 
broader approach to managing conflicts in the near abroad. Yeltsin’s infamous 28 February 
1993 speech to the Civic Union calling for UN recognition of Russia’s indispensable position 
as guarantor of peace and stability in the FSU represents the first of many statements made by 
the president that reveal his developing centrist nationalist views on foreign policy. This shift 
also reflects Yeltsin’s increasingly open willingness to allow the military establishment a 
freer hand in directing Russia’s foreign policy in the near abroad, noticeable particularly in 
light of Grachev’s comments earlier that week declaring Abkhazia “a strategically important 
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area for the Russian Army,” before an unsanctioned trip to Gudauta on 30 February to, as 
ITAR-TASS reported, “support the troops.”   241
Although bombings in Sukhumi intensified considerably shortly after his arrival, 
Grachev continued to deny circumstantial evidence of direct Russian aid to Abkhazia. He 
even went so far as to suggest that bombing raids supposedly carried out by recognizably 
Russian aircraft were in fact executed by Georgian planes with Russian flags painted on 
ostensibly because “a real war is being waged in Georgia by the government against its own 
people.”  Even after evidence of Russian interference was made public following the 242
downing of Major Shipko’s aircraft the next day, Grachev did not adjust his assessment or 
face reprisal from Moscow for his now blatant deception. Rather, Grachev was appointed by 
Yeltsin to head the ceasefire negotiations the following July.  This all suggests what many 243
within Russia already presumed, that Yeltsin had effectively relinquished control over 
military policy in Abkhazia to the Ministry of Defence. Statements from the Russian press at 
the time confirm this, with ​Nezavisimaya Gazeta ​reporting on 20 March of growing 
“bewilderment” in Tbilisi regarding “Yeltsin’s silence with regards to the Abkhaz conflict” 
leaving both Georigans and the Russian people wondering whether he intends to “leave 
Shevardnadze one on one with the Russian military” or “chose to interfere in the events.”   244
Much of this indecision can be explained by Yeltsin’s increasingly tenuous grip on 
political power at the beginning of 1993. Yeltsin had already begun to bend to parliamentary 
pressure for his weak support for the rights of Russians and other minorities in the near 
abroad, as he began to levy similar criticism against the Foreign Ministry in October 1992.  245
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By January 1993, significant changes had occured within Yeltsin’s government, particularly 
the replacement of former Prime Minister Yegor Gaidar, the face of Russia’s ambitious and 
controversial “shock therapy” program, with the ex-director of Gazprom, Viktor 
Chernomyrdin, signalling a shift away from the liberal economic policy heralded by the 
Westernizers in Moscow. Furthermore, by late 1992, it had become clear that previously 
entertained proposals for Western financial aid packages were unlikely to gain the necessary 
parliamentary and administrative support in Washington and Brussels, thereby wholly 
discounting the liberal argument that Russia should contain its military actions in the near 
abroad in order to protect hopes of Western aid.  Donaldson and Nogee report this gradual 246
realization as having been crucial towards ending the “Romantic” period of Russian foreign 
policy and signalling a shift by the liberals towards more “pragmatic nationalist” views.  247
By this point, the Foreign Ministry began to adapt to these major domestic and 
structural shifts and thus grew to develop a harder position on the Abkhaz issue and on 
Russia’s foreign policy options in general. Beginning in late 1992, the MFA grew harshly 
critical of the Georgian military’s actions in Abkhazia, labelling the 14 December downing of 
a Russian refugee helicopter a“gross provocation.”  Deputy Foreign Minister Boris 248
Pastukhov joined in roughly a week later, calling Georgia’s attack an intentional act of 
barbarism before later adding, rather ominously, that “We [Russia] will not let you win this 
war.”  As mentioned before, spring and summer of 1993 saw Kozyrev himself begin to 249
reorient the Foreign Ministry towards support for Russian unilateralism in the conflict 
resolution process. He also began to endorse more “traditional” conceptions of Russia’s 
foreign policy goals in the region, stressing in July 1993 “the strategic and economic 
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importance Russia attaches to the Northern Caucasus and to its southern areas as a whole,” as 
well as Russia’s need for a stable and friendly Georgia.  This shift began to signal a new era 250
in Russian Foreign policy making that was decidedly centrist nationalist in character.  
Foreign Policy Consensus in Action: Peacekeeping as a Tool of Coercion 
This coalescence of foreign policy consensus in Moscow gave life to an ostensible 
strategy for Russia’s ongoing manipulation of the Abkhaz crisis. Beginning in mid-1993, 
Russian policy in Georgia aimed to secure Georgia’s position in CIS, establish a legal 
framework for a continued and indefinite Russian military presence in Georgia, and achieve 
an international mandate for the deployment of Russian peacekeeping troops in the near 
abroad. As these goals became achievable in the fall of 1993 following a series of key events 
in Abkhazia over the summer, the Russian position grew increasingly more forceful and 
coherent. 
Against seemingly insurmountable odds, the so-called “Abkhaz separatists” had by 
July 1993 succeeded in securing a series of key victories against Georgian forces. Owing 
largely to Abkhazian advances, as well as increasing pressure from Grachev and newly 
appointed special envoy to Abkhazia, Boris Pastukhov, Shevardnadze was induced to sign a 
ceasefire agreement with Abkhazia in Sochi on 27 July 1993 wherein Georgia agreed to 
substantial concessions, including the restoration of the Abkhazian government and the 
withdrawal of both Abkhazian and Georgian troops from the conflict zone.  Though the 251
treaty succeeded in restoring Russian-Georgian bilateral relations, definitive negotiations 
were stalled in part due to Georgia’s refusal to accept Russian basing rights in Georgia or 
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endorse a Russian peacekeeping mission, even going so far as to request a UN sponsored 
mission in its place.  252
Mere weeks later, on 15 September, Abkhazian forces broke the ceasefire agreement 
and launched a massive and well-organized offensive to retake Sukhumi. The Russian 
response was seemingly mixed as officials in Moscow imposed limited economic sanctions 
against Abkhazia and condemned their unsanctioned use of force. Closer inspection reveals a 
number of inconsistencies with the Russian position. First of all, Shevardnadze’s request for 
Russian troops to enforce the separation of warring forces was initially rejected based on the 
thinly veiled excuse that “riots” in Sukhumi prevented the safe deployment of Russian forces 
in the conflict zone.  Serious questions also arose regarding the Abkhazian forces’ 253
possession of heavy artillery and rocket launchers at the time of the attacks, the breechblocks 
for which the Russian military was supposed to have confiscated according to the Sochi 
agreement.  This evidence, alongside the surprisingly impressive combat performance of the 254
Abkhazian forces against the only partially withdrawn Georgian forces, strongly suggests 
Russia’s benign underestimation of, if not direct coordination with, the Abkhaz separatists.  
Shortly before and after the assault, Grachev had also pressed Georgian Defense 
Ministry officials to accept a treaty confirming the legal status of Russian troops on Georgian 
soil, repeatedly linking the issue to the signing of a treaty of friendship and treaty as well as 
to “the restoration of lasting peace in Abkhazia.”  Similar, if not more forceful, demands 255
were presented by Russian Vice Premier Alexander Shokhin in the days following 
Abkhazia’s attack, wherein he reinforced the fact that under current circumstances, Moscow 
252 ​Interfax, ​20 September 1993; cited in Hill and Jewett, ​"Back in the USSR," ​54, 56-57. 
253 Kozhokin, ​US and Russian Policymaking with Respect to the Use of Force​, 80.  
254 Hill and Jewett, ​"Back in the USSR," ​55.  
255 ITAR-TASS, 25 September 1993; cited in Dale, ​Peacekeeping and the Role of Russia in Eurasia​, 128. 
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would not interfere to enforce the ceasefire or prevent Georgia’s defeat in Abkhazia.  256
Accordingly, Russian aid was unforthcoming and the Abkhazians were able to retake 
Sukhumi and secure the border with Georgia within a matter of weeks.  
The abject failure of Georgian forces to repel the Abkhaz offensive signalled the 
unceremonious return of Gamsakhurdia, whose “Zviadist” forces quickly occupied the 
majority of western Georgia, cutting off major supply lines to the capital and pushing the 
government in Tbilisi nearly to the point of collapse. Still unable to secure outside aid and 
facing imminent and forceful removal from power, Shevardnadze travelled to Moscow on 8 
October 1993 to reach a compromise agreement with Russia. In a series of talks that would 
continue into the following year, Shevardnadze, in exchange for Russia’s aid in repelling 
Gamsakhurdia’s forces and preventing the “full dismemberment” of the Georgian state, 
agreed to accept CIS membership on Georgia’s behalf, lease the Black Sea port of Poti to 
Russia, and allow Russian troops to remain in Georgia indefinitely.  In exchange, Russian 257
troops were deployed to Georgia to stabilize the situation and, though dispatched with the 
declared intention securing key rail and telecommunications networks, helped crucially aid 
Georgian forces in the forcible expulsion of Zviadist forces from the country.  Russia also 258
engaged in a series of talks with Tbilisi beginning in November 1993 and culminating in the 
1994 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation which, alongside finalizing Russia’s basing rights 
in Georgia also formalized a UN sponsored return of Georgian refugees to Abkhazia.  259
Particularly as events in Chechnya worsened, Russia also proceeded to crack down on 
Abkhazia, condemning harshly its brutal treatment of Georgians denying it any prospects of 
achieving independence from Georgia.  
256 ​Interfax, ​17 September 1993; cited in Hill and Jewett, ​"Back in the USSR," ​55.  
257 Hill and Jewett, ​"Back in the USSR," ​58.  
258 Ibid., 58-59.  
259 Lynch, ​Russian Peacekeeping Strategies in the CIS, ​143. 
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The results of these talks as a whole, however, in light of Yeltsin’s victory against his 
chief nationalist opponents in the Supreme Soviet, demonstrate the degree to which Yeltsin’s 
influence as president and views on intervention had evolved in the roughly two years since 
he took office. This was also crucially shaped by the Western response (or rather lack 
thereof) to Russia’s actions in Abkhazia. Given the relative absence of international observers 
and the fact that much of Russia’s purported interference remains either unconfirmed or 
subject to scrutiny, the international community was largely silent on the course of events in 
Abkhazia, a circumstance amplified by the worsening crisis in Yugoslavia to which Western 
governments were much more inclined to direct their attention.  
Nonetheless, Shevardnadze hoped that Georgia might be able to secure a multilateral 
peacekeeping mission that might limit Russia’s ability to unilaterally dictate the terms of 
settlement. In spite of his popularity in the West, Shevardnadze watched in disappointment as 
Britain, France, and the United States all expressed deep hesitation towards participating in a 
United Nations peacekeeping operation, ultimately forcing the Georgian prime minister little 
choice but to request Russian aid for the enforcement of a permanent peace settlement.  260
Though the eventual Russian mission lacked a UN mandate, it received support from then 
UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali who in May 1994 recommended that the UN 
endorse a Russia-led peacekeeping force, given the fact that the conditions for a UN 
operation remained unfulfilled at the time.   261
Bill Clinton even expressed his own somewhat confused endorsement of Russian 
actions in the near abroad, noting in a 14 January 1994 speech to a Russian TV audience that 
Russia’s forays into its “near abroad” are not unlike the United States interventions in 
Grenada and Panama, themselves having been subject to intense scrutiny from the UN 
260 Kozhokin, ​US and Russian Policymaking with Respect to the Use of Force​, 81..  
261 Lynch, ​Russian Peacekeeping Strategies in the CIS, ​140.  
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Security Council, and shakily compared Russia’s actions in the region to those the US has 
traditionally pursued under its Monroe Doctrine.  With the apparent, albeit weak and at 262
times begrudging acquiescence of the West, Russia was more or less granted a free hand to 
secure its strategic victories in the region. Thus on 10 May 1994, Shevardnadze agreed to the 
deployment of a Russia-sponsored CIS peacekeeping force of 3,000 troops to be deployed 
along both sides of the Inguri river, the natural land divide between Abkhazia and Georgia.   263
Ultimately, the results of the Abkhaz war and the conflict in South Ossetia were 
formative to the degree that they further crystalized a consensus amongst Russian foreign 
policy elites on the efficacy and necessity of unilateral intervention and peacekeeping 
missions. Resolve amongst the various centers of gravity within Moscow on how best to 
achieve these goals was, much like in Moldova, at first varied and reflected the mutually 
conflictual ideational interests of the actors and administrative departments involved. While 
conflict resolution initially served as a means for localizing both regional wars to prevent 
conflict spillover and the creation of a power vacuum that might invite the interference of 
other regional powers, the increasing influence of the military, intervention and peacekeeping 
were ultimately adopted as a means of ensuring Georgian membership in the CIS and 
constructing a legal framework to justify continued Russian troop presence. Yeltsin’s 
growing domestic unpopularity and weak responses from the West allowed for this gradual 
maturation of a more assertive and coercive Russian policy in Georgia. As a result of these 
changing circumstances, response efforts gradually shifted from confused and slow moving 
attempts at peaceful reconciliation into a suasive strategy designed to coerce Tbilisi into 
262 ​United States. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. ​The Clinton Foreign Policy Record : 
An Evaluation : Hearing before the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, One 
Hundred Fourth Congress, Second Session, 2 May 1996.​ Washington: U.S. G.P.O. : For Sale by the U.S. 
G.P.O., Supt. of Docs., Congressional Sales Office, 1996, 5. 
263 Kozhokin, ​US and Russian Policymaking with Respect to the Use of Force​, 81-82.  
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accepting Moscow’s designs for institutionalized and internationally recognized regional 









Russia is a country very often regarded as a baseline test case for realist theory. As a 
traditionally centralized state, Russia is often typecast as an insecure aggressor, equally prone 
to uncooperativeness on the world stage as it is to expansionism on its fringes. While the 
tendency to assume that such characteristics are predetermined may be tempting, Russia’s 
ostensibly cooperative and accommodating political character following the collapse of the 
Soviet Union complicates this seemingly straightforward assumption. Whether the 
decentralization and “liberalism” of the Russian Federation in the early 1990’s represents a 
historical anomaly for a typically autocratic state is the subject of a different discussion. What 
matters more is how and why Russia’s liberals abandoned their more integrationist views in 
favor of more “realist” national interests.  
When asked the spring of 1994 to explain the noticeable shift in his views on foreign 
policy, Andrey Kozyrev noted that “as a democrat he felt constrained to take into account 
public opinion on foreign policy matters.”  This comment might be more facetious than it is 264
264 See Andrei Kozyrev, interview with ​Segodnia,​ April 30 1994, as summarized in ​RFE/RL Daily Report, ​2 
May  1994, cited in Checkel, “Structure, Institutions, and Process: Russia's Changing Foreign Policy,” 56. 
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demonstrative of Kozyrev’s serious convictions on the matter, however, the thrust of his 
statement speaks to a very important assumption that this project seeks to assert: national 
ideas matter. Whether articulated or acted upon implicitly, national ideas form the basis of 
political action and set the parameters for failure or success. They can empower domestic 
political coalitions and they can topple powerful regimes.  
As has been previously asserted, the Russian foreign policy establishment’s gradual 
endorsement of interventionist views can be traced directly to the deligitmation of liberal 
ideas promoting diplomatic approaches to conflict resolution, thus creating ideal 
circumstances for hawkish policy entrepreneurs to press for a more active interventionist 
policy in the near abroad. The perceivably successful model for intervention and 
peacekeeping was first showcased in Moldova, as a result of which Russia was able to ensure 
Moldova’s entrance in the CIS, exclude Romania from the peace process, and maintain a 
strategic troop presence in Transnistria. This can be seen further through Russia’s responses 
to the conflicts in both South Ossetia and Abkhazia as the progression of events on the 
ground which repeatedly confirmed the utility of Russian intervention and peacekeeping 
efforts towards achieving Russia’s national interests in the region. The mission to South 
Ossetia represents a watershed moment for the development of a template for Russian 
peacekeeping, setting a standard that would help to fuel support for and legitimize later 
Russian missions. These effects were most noticeable following the Russian military’s covert 
intervention and eventual peacekeeping mission in Abkhazia, which yielded considerable 
results, namely Georgia’s admission into the CIS, the preemption of interference from 
regional rivals and international organizations, and the international community’s ​de facto 
acceptance of Russia as a reliable peacekeeping force in the near abroad.  
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This process was made possible by an array of key circumstantial factors that helped 
weaken the liberal platform and empower those with more assertive and statist foreign policy 
strategies. In this sense, the decentralized structure of the early Russian Federation was 
instrumental in that it prevented the initially dominant liberal ideas held by the Foreign 
Minister, the President, and his entourage from being sufficiently institutionalized. This in 
turn had consequences at the domestic level, as Yeltsin’s enemies in parliament aggressively 
exploited his leadership weakness and tenuous power base, forcing him to rely increasingly 
on individuals and factions within the military for political support, thus facilitating the 
greater autonomy of the armed forces to pursue and initiate intervention. Finally, and perhaps 
most importantly, the Western response to Russia’s growing assertiveness was decidedly 
weak and apprehensive, leaving Russia little to lose should it seek to further instrumentalize 
“peacekeeping” as a gendarme of Russian influence in the near abroad. As a result, once 
intervening events such as the successful defense of Bendery (and general absence of 
international repercussions) alongside the failure to secure Western financial aid 
delegitimated the key assumptions of the liberal camp, centrist and radical nationalist policy 
entrepreneurs were able to exploit these open policy windows to forward their more 
aggressive foreign policy ideas. The result was the gradual adoption of more pragmatic 
centrist nationalist views on foreign policy by actors from across the ideational spectrum.  
Although this project deals specifically with the immediate post-Soviet period, the 
conclusions drawn here are nonetheless helpful towards understanding the current state of 
foreign policy making in the Russian Federation. Most notably, since current President 
Vladimir Putin’s rise to prominence beginning in 1999, Russia has grown increasingly 
centralized both institutionally and politically. Putin has successfully co-opted or eliminated 
key members of the influential industrial oligarch class, silenced the free press, and 
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established effectively personalized control over the legislative branch, the judicial system, 
and the armed forces. These factors have allowed the national ideas commonly forwarded by 
the president to enjoy stable support within the Russian national discourse. 
It is also interesting to note that many of the ideas that Putin endorses revolve around 
conspicuously centrist nationalist positions, namely the restoration of Russia’s great power 
status, limited yet pragmatic rapprochement with the West, and the defence of 
Russian/Russophone minorities in the near abroad. The president’s articulation of these ideas 
has played a major role in his justifying the implementation of interventionist efforts in recent 
years, particularly in regards to the August 2008 war in South Ossetia and the March 2014 
annexation of Crimea. Despite the remarkably negative and costly responses that such actions 
have garnered from the international community, Russia’s commitment to an assertive 
foreign policy has persisted.  
This is in part due to Putin’s personalized control over policy formulation and 
execution as well as his systematic exclusion of potential rivals from the political process. 
These roadblocks to significant ideational change in Moscow have troubling implications as 
they suggest that Russia might again seek to justify similarly interventionist efforts elsewhere 
within the FSU. Should Putin perceive potential threats to Russian minorities in, for example, 
the Baltic states, all of which are now members of NATO, the question of whether or not 
Russia might intervene as a reactionary measure remains uncomfortably ambiguous. 
Regardless, absent any major shocks to the existing international order, institutional 
restructuring within Moscow, or any other independently occurring domestic political 
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